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Introduction 
It is characteristically distinctive of the American 
labor n1ovement that the stormy petrel of the contemporary 
lahor scene should 1 e - not a leader of communist, socialist, 
or syndicalist persuasion - but a relatively conservative 
husiness unionist, a lheit a ruggedly a ggressive one. For the 
past two de cades John L. Lewis has held unchalleng ed, in the 
eyes of husinessmen and a considerahle p ortion of the gen eral 
puhlic, the position of the nation's Numher One Bad Man in the 
area of business-lahor controversy. To husiness and husiness-
r e lat ed white collar groups p articularly he had heen outranked 
in disrepute by none, not even former President Franklin D. 
Roosevelt, with whose labor policies Lewis was closely 
identified in the decade of the Great Depression. 
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The odium which has attached to the name and figure of 
John L. Lewis has been the penalty of his success. His militant 
l e adership of the United Mine Workers of America has made 
powerful enemies for himself and his union, outside as well as 
inside the coal fields. This hostility grew with the rising 
p ower of the miners ' organization and their success in wres t ing 
conces s ions from the mine op e rators. Lewis' role in the 
formation of the CIO, during the Thirties, and his resolute 
(and, as it seemed to many, willful) inde p endence during the 
years of g lohal war, the determination with which he pursued 
advantag es for his union, made him a focal fi gure for anti-
labor sentiment. In the lahor upheavals of the 11 reconversion" 
p eriod after the war, though Lewis was no longer a leading 
officer in the CIO nor the prime mover in the waves of strikes 
that succeeded the relative peace on the industrial front in 
wartime, his commanding position in the key industry of coal 
and his vigorous leadership made him the dominant symbol of 
the new power of organized labor in America. Anti-labor 
p ropagandists heaped their most strenuous abuse upon the leader 
of the UMW and sought to fix in the puhlic mind the shaggy-
hrowed, massive-jawed image of John L. Lewis as the em~odied 
symDol of labor irresponsihility. 
In this respect the miners' leader was inversely useful 
to the forces of reaction that began to gain headway at the 
close of the war. The post-war '' reaction" was a complex 
phenomenon which represented, to some extent, a natural 
emotional reaction against the regimentation and the emotional 
demands of wartime, hut in its political aspect it was a 
continuation of the prewar opposition to the ~ew Deal and its 
works, particularly in the field of lahor. The cry of the 
opposition was the need to redress the halance of strength in 
employer-employee relations, which had heen upset since the 
onset of the New Deal. ~roposals for governmental intervention 
for this purpose were widely aired. With characteristic 
ambivalence, some of the same elements that demanded, as the 
solution for runaway price tendencies, the elimination of 
governmental controls, called for constricted legal limits on 
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lahor irresponsibility. ~he forces of reaction, emhracing 
elements both of those genuinely convinced of a need for 
disciplined reform and of those concealing Machiavellian 
motives in rhetoric concerning ~He public welfare, required 
for their purposes a personification of the enemy, a striking 
symbol, in short a devil. For this role John L. Lewis was 
well-fitted, hy his forceful and histrionic personality, by 
his grim and unswerving drive for power and advantage for the 
miners' union, and by the hasic nature of his position in the 
pyramid of industrial production. 
Industrial conflict in the postwar period resulted in a 
new crystallization of national lahor policy, emhodied in the 
Taft-Hartley law of 1947. Whatever the merits or demerits of 
the law, which remains clouded in controversy, it is notable 
hecause, first, it was a major legislative attempt to construct 
a p ositive national lahor policy for the postwar era, and 
secondly, hecause it was promoted and enacted under the 
s p onsorship and with the hacking of persons and groups unsympa-
thetic to the asp irations of organized lahor. It is fair to 
state that the chief impetus and pretext for this legislation 
and for the national labor policy which it enacted, was the UMW 
and its doughty chief. The purpose of this essay, or thesis, 
is to descrihe the role of the UMW in the postwar labor scene 
and to show its relation to the several hranches of the 
national government in order to demonstrat e the formative 
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impact of the miners' organization on national lahor policy in 
this critical period. 
-iv-
Chapter I 
John L. Lewis, Business Trade Unionist 
Since 1890 when the United Mine Workers of America was 
1 
formed at Columbus, Ohio, by amalgamation of the Progressive 
Union and the National Trades Assembly No. 135 of the Knights 
of Lahor and received its charter from the recently organized 
American Federation of Labor, the miners' union has been a 
storm center. Its principles and policy, however, aside from 
the practice of organization on industrial rather than craft 
lines, have heen hasically conservative. Opinion both of 
professionals and of laymen toward this union has changed 
markedly since the early years, when it was said to be "one 
2 
of the most democratic organizations in the world," yet 
while the character of its management has changed, its funda-
mental tenets have remained relatively consistent. The UMW 
has heen an effective business organization representing, 
despite palace intrigues for place and power at the top, the 
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interests of its members. These interests have be en practical 
and substantial, and no labor leader has more practically or 
vig orously represented his constituents' interests than has 
3 
John L. Lewis, who became president of the union in 1920 
and grimly clung to his office in the violent decades that 
followed. 
In his labor philosophy John L. Lewis has been primarily 
a business trade-unionist. By working through the trade union, 
according to this view, the wage-earner b y his own effort 
can achieve higher wages, shorter hours and better working 
conditions. The achievement of these aims is a continuous 
never-ending process; the union having made one gain will 
press for still another. The labor philosophy or Lewis, 
therefore, is a simple one, if it can he called a philosophy 
at all. In the Gompers tradition, he has demanded for his 
union ''more, more, more - now. 11 Since the desire to achieve 
''more" within the context of the existing capitalistic system 
is neither new nor revolutionary, the president of the United 
Mine Workers of America has felt that this view should have 
"the support of every thinking business man in the United 
4 
States." 
-2-
Lewis economic principles have been conservative, which 
is to say drawn from nineteenth century liheralism, though 
with sp ecial allowance for the role of the trade union. He has 
heen an adherent or laissez-faire, and the only book puhlished 
hy him, The Miners' Fight for American Standards, reads like a 
tract on the tenets of Adam Smith. In the early stages of his 
career Lewis firmly believed that demands for more and more 
could best be achieved in a free competitive system, allowing 
"natural economic laws free play in the production and 
5 
distrihution of coal." John L. Lewis, like his business 
counterparts, has been a disciple of Charles Graham Sumner 
and similarly would brook no governmental interference in the 
affairs of business or labor, which he regarded as being 
rightfully autonomous interests whose differences must be 
-3-
reconciled in the arena and without external interference. 
Business had chosen to work through the corporation; labor had 
designated the trade union as its medium. In essence Lewis 
considered the two as analogous, and argued that "trade-
unionism is a phenomenon of capitalism quite similar to the 
6 
corporation •••• The economic aims of both are identical -gain." 
This statement epitomizes Lewis' economic conservatism, in 
its elevation of the trade union to respectability by 
assimilation with the dominant philosophy of materialism, the 
gospel of cash. 
As a believer in free competition and laissez-faire, 
Lewis required only, in the name of consistency, that labor 
he allowed freedom equally with business. If the business 
man or corporation demanded competitive freedom, that freedom 
must also be enjoyed by the workingman if he was to have the 
opportunity to raise his standard of living. If, on the 
contrary, the right of free competition was to be confined to 
the corporation, then Lewis believed this would not be in 
validity the age of capitalism but merely a continuation of a 
feudalistic age into which machinery had heen projected. 
Opposition to higher wages for the workingman he regarded as 
a product of the pre-capitalist mentality. If it is natural 
and "capitalistic '' for business to seek greater profits and 
avoid losses, within the context of the same system it is 
natural for lahor to seek higher wages and fewer losses of 
life. Yet if, on the other hand, business presumes that 
lahor should sacrifice its desire for higher wages in order 
to increase profits, and considers that lahor 1 s demands for 
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more and more are radical and even revolutionary, then business 
is under the guidance of "the feudal mind speaking in a 
7 
cap italist age." 
It was natural for John L. Lewis as a business trade-
unionist to adhere to the doctrine of laissez-faire. Govern-
mental committees that had, in the Twenties, made lengthy 
investigations of the coal industry could offer no other 
solution to the industry•s ills than the natural play of 
economic forces. Members of these committees, usually 
representatives of the business class, were merely adhering 
to the philosophy in which they had been carefully grounded 
and which reflected the economic interests they identified 
as their own. For a different reason, however, John L. Lewis 
demanded a 11 hands off" policy on the part of government. 
Up until 1933 governmental intervention in conflicts in the 
coal fields had resulted in the application of the Sherman 
Anti-Trust Act to the United Mine Workers of America and, 
8 
under that authority, the use of the injunction. Until the 
enactment of NRA, governmental interference in the coal 
industry, therefore, had resulted in restriction on labor 
activities. Hence, as long as governmental labor policy 
remained negative, J·ohn L. Lewis continued to stand on the 
dogma of laissez-faire. In this respect his attitude 
represented that of management. As early as 1925 he realized 
there might he times when labor would be ohliged to turn to 
government, but asserted that submission to governmental 
paternalism would still he repugnant to the trade unions. 
Lewis stated: 
The American workingman no more than the 
American businessman wants to be babied 
by any paternalistic agencies, govern-
mental or private. He may suhmit when 
he has to, to a feudal overlord in in-
dustry. He may even for a time accept 
philantbhopic largesse dispensed in 
that m~nner, but he will never like it. 
He will never become spiritually recon-
ciled to such conditions. 9 
Repudiation of L~issez-faire 
-5-
By 1933, however, Lewis had swung away from his laissez 
faire position. The r~nks of lahor had heen depleted ~y the 
hitter depression, and the outlook was bleak. The man who had 
sharply criticized governmental boards and commissions, the 
man who had opposed national labor policy whether paternalistic 
or negative, sat down with the New Deal "brain-trusters" to 
work out a program that contradicted his views of a decade 
~efore. it had taken a conservative lahor movement and a 
conservative labor leader a half century to repudiate the 
nineteenth century liberalism under which they had all too 
willingly worked. Samuel Gompers had finally lost his hold 
over the American labor movement. 
Within the next seven years, John L. Lewis, his only 
philosophy being one of opportunism, entered into a close 
relationship with the government, taking full advantage of the 
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lahor aids extended. The man who in large part formulated 
NRA policy hecame inextricably bound up in national labor 
policy so that his influence and power were felt in every 
10 
major governmental measure, whether positively or negatively. 
Basically, the NRA was consonant with Lewis' earlier 
contention that an increase in the workersr wages would by 
increasing their buying power, buoy up the whole economic 
structure. As early as 1903 and 1922 when the Hational 
Association of Manufacturers and the Chamher of Commerce of 
the United States were waging their open shop campaigns, they 
had attracted capital and enterprise to various cities such 
as Los Angeles by advertising that they had low wage rates. 
"But within a few years," as Lewis stated in 1925, "capital 
can no longer he lured to low wage communities, because 
capital is becoming even more concerned with selling what it 
produces, and it knows that its sales will he restricted in 
11 
low wage markets." 
Increased purchasing power, therefore; which was the 
major object of the NRA, had earlier been recognized as the 
essential factor in the American economy hy .John L. Lewis. 
In 1925, however, he believed that the union could by itself 
achieve that purchasing power for the worker. By 1933, his 
cooperation with the Roosevelt "brain-trusters" demonstrated 
that in time of depression even staunch unionists were forced 
to turn to the governmental paternalism which their basic 
philosophy had strongly rejected. John L. Lewis deviated 
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from his laissez faire philosophy with imperial self-assurance, 
and with an undiminished air of leadership. The union was 
ahle to maintain its self-resp ect because NRA appeared to 
b e not so much the creation of Washington "bureaucrats" as it 
was the p roduct of an attempt by labor leaders to restore the 
national industrial scene to its former status by increasing 
wages and therefore subsidizing business recovery. The program 
was, in the eyes of Lewis, one of reform and not relief. The 
unity of Lewis' views and New Deal economic thought was 
ap parent in his contemporary statements, such as the following: 
I want the common people to share in the 
increased productive efficiency of indus-
try and the miracles of modern science. 
Give them the buying power to enahle them 
t~ purchase the output. Otherwise our 
system will slow down • 
•••• We have spent billions of dollars for 
relief. Every dollar in addition to 
supporting workers went to the merchant's 
till. It was a direct subsidy to small 
business. 
I have no panaceas for sharing the wealth. 
I want an increased purchasing power. 12 
Lewis and the CIO 
With the enactment of the NRA, John L. Lewis and his 
organizing force marched out to the southern coal fields and 
told the miners that the President of the United States wanted 
13 
them to join the union. In this respect the NRA did not fail: 
thousands of workers flocked into the ranks of labor unions. 
~he ~rN with a membership of 100,000 in 1933, could in 1934 
14 
report a memhership of 400,000. The invalidation of the NRA 
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did not affect union memhership, for the National Labor 
Relations Act, 1935, continued the same policy of guaranteeing 
to workers the right to join nunions of their own choosing." 
Thousands of workers were stricken with the joining 
craze. These were primarily the semi-skilled and unskilled 
workers in the mass production industries. They soon 
discovered, however, that there was no union that they could 
join, or if the American Federation of Labor thought fit to 
organize them, these workers were split and apportioned to 
different craft unions so that within the same plant, the 
workers sacrificed their group solidarity in favor of craft 
particularism. 
At the time of the enactment of the NRA, the Government 
had assumed that any policy of encouragement to organization 
would react to the benefit primarily of the American Federation 
of Labor. But the AFL, hesitant to deviate from its craft 
hasis, vacillated continually over the question of extending 
unionism to the mass production industries, such as the 
automohile and steel industries. A group within the AFL, 
eag er to organize the mass-production worker and impatient 
with the weak and hesitant policy of the AFL, demanded prompt 
action upon a program of organization. This group, the 
Committee of Industrial Organization, designed first to educate 
the workers in a program of industrial organization, was 
repudiated hy the majority of the AFL. 
The formation of the Congress of Industrial Organization, 
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an outgrowth of the former committee for educational purposes, 
resulted in certain adaptations in Lewis' policies. Although 
the United Mine Workers of America had always heen organized 
along industrial lines, this was due to the nature of the 
coal industry, which was peculiarly adapted to industrial 
unionism owing to its isolated position and the relative lack 
of occup ational differentiation along craft lines. In the 
past, Lewis had always opposed the radical lahor movements 
that sought to organize the semi-skilled and unskilled workers 
15 
in the mass production industries. This opposition was 
directed at the radicalism of such organizations as the Inter-
national Workers of the World and other syndicalist movements 
rather than at the concept of industrial unionism itself; 
yet on the other hand Lewis gave no positive endorsement to 
industrial unionism as a specific for labor organization. 
With the rise of the CIO, however, he assumed a position of 
leadership in the greatest movement of this type in American 
history, and one which was hound to attract the radicals 
Lewis had consistently opposed. Communists entered the viO 
hut Lewis remained silent, apparently helieving he could 
16 
utilize and control them. Thus the formation of the CIO 
at the same time committed Lewis to the spread of the principle 
of organization successfully employed in his own union, and 
raised an important question as to attitude toward the radical 
strain in the lahor movement. 
There was also involved an intensified question as to 
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the role of government in industrial relations. Organization 
of mass-production industries required governmental encourage-
ment and protection. This was an admission that the workers 
concerned could not be organized massively, with any 
durability, without decisive legal guarantees of the right to 
organize. An important factor in the current situation was 
the fact that the governmental paternalism which Lewis, 
following Gompers, had previously rejected, gave strength 
and meaning to the trade union agreement which it had never 
hefore possessed. This situation required further concessions 
~y Lewis of the importance of political assistance to the 
labor movement, a strengthening of the changed attitude toward 
g overnmental intervention he displayed from the outset of the 
New Deal. 
A third change lay in the fact that with the organiza-
tion of the ~IO there was introduced a problem of dualism, 
the existence of two unions coextensively in the same plant 
or craft, which had always been vigorously opposed by 
conservative trade-unionists, among whom Lewis must he 
numh ered. 
With little hesitation, Lewis assumed control of the 
new organization. At first, the Congress of Industrial urgani-
zation was financed primarily hy funds from the United Mine 
Workers' treasury which provided, from 1936 to 1938, when the 
CIO was being organized, the astonishing total of ~7,249,000 
in cash and services, 88 .37 per cent of the total cost of 
17 
organization. The price of launching industrial unionism 
on a national scale was a steep one, but it was a price Lewis 
was more than ready to meet, even though he saw little or 
18 
no prospect of repayment. Lewis had high hopes for the 
new labor movement for whose organization he was largely 
responsibile, and at the time of its formation considered 
it to he his most significant contrihution to the American 
lahor movement. tie stated: 
I think this was the greatest mass maneuver 
of organized industry and organized labor 
in all history. Its results will affect 
the lives of thousands yet unhorn. I 
believe it was no little achievement and 
I have reason to be proud of the part I 
played. 19 
In spite of changes in the Lewis philosophy, the new 
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lahor movement was neither radical nor visionary. vonservative 
rusiness unionism as practiced hy the United Mine Workers of 
America was to be taught to thousands of workers in the mass-
production industries. The trade union agreement was still 
to he the means of gaining labor objectives. The strike was 
still the major strategic weapon. And the goal, as ever, was 
"more, more, more - now." 
The CIO had as its chief working demonstration of 
industrial unionism the United Mine Workers of America, a 
union that has managed to survive industrial conflict for over 
half a century, and had as its leader a man experienced in 
the prohlems of industrial unionism; moreover, the CIO was 
favored hy governmental protection of the right to organize -
factors which previous industrial labor movements had lacked. 
Joh-consciousnes s Versus Cl~~s- consciousness 
Industrial unionists in the past had depended upon 
class solidarity to g ive unity to a large industrial union. 
But within the industrial unions, the multiplicity of national 
orig ins had often prevented the unity of class that had heen 
po s s ihle in European countrie s. With the ore anization of the 
CIO, accusations of "communism" were again to be hurl e d at 
a large industrial union, for in management 1 s eyes the CIO 
wa s composed of agitators and malcontents g oaded to unwhole-
some policie s by an inferiority comp l ex . The U1vfWA had heen 
20 
charged with the same malady, the inferiority complex, the 
result of their isolation. Lewis was determined , however, 
that even in an industrial union job-consciousness would he 
the primary psychological motif. The inferiority complex, 
Lewis heli eved, develop s from a class-consciousness p rescrihe d 
hy communists. As Lewis stated: 
I'm not interested in classes •••• Far ~e 
it from me to foster inferiority complexe s 
among the workers hy trying to make them 
think t hey he long to some special r i g id 
class. That has happened in Europe , hut 
it hasn't happ ened here yet. Of course, 
it's true, as you say, that there is no 
longer equality of opportunity in this 
country , and it is conc eivahle that if 
this dang erous state of affairs is a llowed 
to continue there wi ll not only he class-
consciousness but revolution as well. But 
it can he avoided. The employers aren't 
doing much to avoid it. Rut the United 
Mine Workers are doing everything in their 
p ower to make the system work . 21 
-12-
Lewis has, in point of fact, dealt at first-hand with 
Communists and other leftists, and while the UMW has 
maintained a constitutional ban on communist membership Lewis 
consorted with leading Communists and, during his presidency 
of the CIO, accepted the support of a disciplined and devoted 
22 
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group of Communists in the organization. Yet where Lewis was 
concerned this entente was not a matter of ideological affinity 
hut rather of power p olitics. Lewis p rovided them with an 
organizational home and sheltered them from their many 
opponents, in return for support in union p olitics. The 
liason was weakened by John L. Lewis' break in 1940 with 
Roosevelt and switch to a Republican candidate, which resulted 
in Lewis' resignation from the CIO presidency, and a severance 
eventually occurred over foreign policy. After Hitler ' s attack 
on Russia in 1941 1 which caused the Communist Party's sudden 
and embarrassing change of front with regard to Roosevelt and 
the war, Lewis' increasing isolationism estranged his co~nunist 
23 
supporters and produced an open cleavage. The communist 
defection disenchanted him and opened his eyes to the realities 
of his relation with them. He had apparently Delieved he 
could control them, and that the jobs and security his grasp 
on union machinery enabled him to dispense were sufficient 
hond for their good behavior and would constrain them to the 
role of useful satellites. For perhaps the first time John L. 
Lewis realized clearly the strength of their subservience to 
a power beyond his own. 
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The UWN chief has not only not heen class-conscious 
or leftist, hut, with the exception perhaps of his early 
insistence on laissez-faire, not a doctrinaire in any respect. 
He has, moreover, been without any internationalist perspec-
tive in his labor views. The President of the British Miners 
Federation once expressed his surprise, after talking with 
Lewis, at Lewis' "ignorance and indifference to labor as an 
24 
international force." His stubborn pragmatism and lack of 
ideological luggage have opened him equally to charges of 
radicalism and of fascism from rightists and leftists, with 
the glib irresponsibility characteristic of those extremes. 
Charges concerning proaeness to fascism have generally been 
strained and tendentious, hut one example may be cited as 
exceptionally shrewd and suggestive; Louis Adamic once warned 
that if John L. Lewis' philosophy did not develop in pace 
with his power, he would usher in a sort of "labor fascism 
whose principal achievement will ~e saving capitalism from 
itself and pushing the American people deeper into a life 
25 
rased on ••• narrow materialistic and quantitative concepts." 
Yet in view of the tragic human record of the miners' world, 
it should perhaps occasion no surprise that Lewis has 
pursued for his constituents material rather than moral 
increment, that his program has been shaped by special group 
interests rather than by a broad social purpose, for it is 
only hy pragmatism and self-interest rather than by the 
pursuit of the ideal that the miners have raised their level 
-15-
of livelihood against hitter opposition. Indeed, sheer ego on 
the part of John L. Lewis, goes farther to explain his conduct 
than does theory. "My adversary," he once wrote, "is a rich 
26 
man named Morgan who lives in New York." This statement 
demonstrating Lewis' tendency to personify contending forces, 
may he regarded as a text on class warfare, but is here 
submitted as revealing, not class-consciousness, but self-
consciousness: the tycoon of lahar ranging himself to do 
hattle as a peer with his husiness counterpart, the tycoon of 
finance. 
Lewis as Lobbyist 
The UMVv leader won, under the New Deal, legislative 
gains comparab le to those achieved in the industrial arena. 
Lewis and his union hecame the strongest lahar pressure group, 
demanding with frequent success favorable labor legislation. 
In the early period of the Roosevelt administration Lewis was 
successful in his efforts to have enacted into law measures 
that would enahle labor to strengthen its bargaining position. 
He p layed a leading role in the formulation of the NRA, the 
Guffey Act, the Wagner Act, the Ellenhogen Textile Bill, the 
Wood Steel Control Bill, the 0 1Mahoney Corporation Licensing 
27 
Bill, and the Black Thirty Hour Week Bill. The first of these 
measures, under the sanction of its Section 7A, enabled him 
to extend unionism in the coal fields and initiate with the 
funds of the United Mine Workers a new industrial labor 
-16-
movement, the Congres~ of Industrial Organization. 
More, More, in War and Peace 
Despite Lewis' legislative excursion, he has remained a 
husiness unionist. Students of the American labor movement 
realize that the Lewis philosophy, the demand for more and 
more, is a philosophy characteristic of all business trade-
unionists. It represents the only program that has produced 
an effective labor movement here. John L. Lewis has been 
repeatedly condemned by business, government, and the public, 
largely hecause he has probably heen the most effective labor 
leader in realizing this program, yet John L. Lewis and other 
husiness unionists consider themselves to he conservatives and 
upholders of the doctrine of laissez-faire and capitalism in 
general. He has on the whole been true to the principles of 
Adam Smith; he has followed faithfully the policy of Samuel 
uompers in demanding more and more. Lewis' major fault from a 
business and public point of view has been that he has followed 
the Gompers' tradition too rigidly. He has persistently 
demande d more in the face of public opp osition. He has 
attempted to extend the trade-union agreement to include 
welfare and health funds, and finally a pension fund for the 
miners. By this last move, he has virtual l y g iven the wage-
earner a p roperty right in his job, the very right that manage-
meht has denied to the wage-earner since the outset of the 
American labor movement. To the miner, the pension plan means 
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security. To the American labor movement, it means another 
pattern to complete. If the criticism of the Lewis philosophy 
is to he negative, then the same criticism must be applicable 
to the entire conservative labor movement. What can most 
validly be said of Lewis is that he has persistently applied 
his philosophy, no matter what the situation, in war as well as 
in peace. For his wartime helligerency he was severely 
condemned. A serviceman, for example, writing to his father, 
a memher of the ~V, said: 
Have heen following the news of the coal 
strike and was wondering what your 
reaction was. It sure is a sad affair, 
and I certainly have lost a lot of respect 
for the Mine Workers Union in the past 
six months, even after considering all the 
good they did for the man in the pit. 28 
What the serviceman had not stopped to consider, however, was 
the fact that the wage scale of the mine workers was lower 
than the scale of pay for workers in industries far less 
hazardous. 
The question presents itself as to how strong and 
p ersistent a labor leader should he. There can be no question 
that John L. Lewis has heen fiercely unrelenting, untiring 
and dogmatic in principles and practices which involve the 
conditions of work and the general welfare of American labor. 
Although there have been other reasons, including personal 
amhition, for the character of his demands in hehalf of labor, 
one fact cann ot be questioned - that the workers have made 
great gains, and under his leadership, in one of the most 
recent controversies have made perhaps one of the greatest 
gains in lahor history, namely the property right in one's 
job, the old-age pension. The UMW long ago recognized the 
need ror strong leadership. During times of strikes, the 
union may he compared to a military organization, which 
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calls for undivided leadership. In the judgment of a profound 
student of the labor movement, a certain authoritarianism 
has been essential to UIDV success; John R. Commons said: 
The vesting of such great power hy the 
United Mine Workers of America in the 
hands of one man is due primarily to the 
exigencies of strike times when for all 
practical purposes the union becomes a 
military organization in the control of 
which there must not be the least possi-
bility of divided leadership. Lahor 
unions have been taught through sad ex-
perience and none more so than the United 
Mine Workers, that an industrial army 
moving for higher wages and hetter condi-
tions of emp loyment must have hut one 
commander-in-chief if the possihility 
of defeat is to be reduced to a minimum. 29 
If John L. Lewis had not been aggressive and demanding, 
if he had not intruded upon and invaded the capitalist 
stronghold, if he had not worked for the extension of the 
trade union agreement, and instead "if Lewis had been a 
plaster saint," as even a writer with a pro-business point 
of view said, "the United Mine Workers would long have met 
the fate of a litter of unwanted kittens in a rock-weighted 
30 
sack." 
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Chapter II 
Politics and Power 
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Since Lord Acton made his famous pronouncement on the 
effects of power, the belief that power inevitably corrupts 
its possessor has come to be regarded virtually as an axiom 
of political and social science, although it would seem to be 
historically more accurate to say that it is generally the 
corrupt who acquire power. Such value judgments must be left, 
however, to the polemics of detractors and apologists; it is 
relevant here only to remark that power is not, as a rule, 
acquired hy accident, hut hy deliherate pursuit. It is 
prohahly fair to state that the pursuit of power for its own 
sake is at least as much the aim of leadership as is the 
implementing of a special policy or program. While this fact 
may have profound moral implications, the mere statement does 
not in itself constitute a moral judgment but simply a fairly 
ohvious psychological generalization. In any case, observers 
with widely differing points of view have, on the whole, 
agreed that hunger for power is the dominant factor in the 
personality and the leadership of John L. Lewis. ~his charge 
along with sweeping moral inferences drawn from it has been 
hackneyed hy the cluster of groups violently opposed not only 
to John L. Lewis hut to the labor movement itself, and from 
that quarter the accusation is merely to he expected. The 
statement when made hy professional friends of labor, however, 
• 
• 
merits more serious attention. The following opinion by 
Harold Laski is representative of that of many leading labor 
sympathizers, with and without Laski's hias toward a special 
program for labor: 
Looking over the history of American 
trade-unionism, it is difficult not to 
admit that, despite his illimitable 
vanity, his ruthlessness, and, what was 
no doubt its main source, his vast 
appetite for power, Mr. Lewis has heen, 
thus far, the most dynamic figure in 
its record. 1 
The course of John L. Lewis' labor leadership must be 
considered, then, in terms of a policy of business trade 
unionism, with its inherent opportunism, and of a personal 
quest for power as well. In the field of labor relations, 
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Lewis has certainly amassed enormous power, in the maintenance 
and use of which ne has demonstrated no over-fine regard for 
democratic self-determination among the rank and file - a fact 
which has provided ammunition for anti-labor puhlicists, 
aroused severe criticism by pro-labor spokesmen, and produced 
a rigorously checked undercurrent of dis ~. ent within Lewis' 
own union. Though he has frequently made rhetorical oheisance 
to democratic principles, pe.rticularly when asserting lah.or' s 
rights as against the operators or against governmental 
intervention with regard to the organization under his manage-
ment, his viewpoint is essentially that of the quarterdeck. 
The effective organization is one in which power is centralized, 
where the chain of command is respected, and the coordinated 
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strength of the mass is expressed in the act of ohedience. 
Only in this way can labor organization he a coherent and 
driving force, can the group which was long heseiged not only 
maintain its position hut take the offensive. The policy 
justifies itself hy its results, not hy scrupulous allowance 
for individual predilections. This was, in the mind of John L. 
Lewis, the root of the matter, as revealed in a question with 
which he confronted his critics within the mine workers' union: 
It is a question of whether you desire 
your organization to he the most effective 
instrumentality within the realm of 
possihility for a labor organization, or 
whether you prefer to sacrifice the 
efficiency of your organization in some 
respect for a little more academic 
freedorn •••• What do you want? Do you want 
an efficient organization or do you want 
merely a political instrumentality. 2 
The power accumulated by John L. Lewis in the field of 
laror relations would satiate the ordinary appetite, ~ut his 
aspirations appear to extend into the governmental sphere as 
well. This is, in a democracy, a quite legitimate aspiration, 
though in the United States alone among the great nations is 
political amhition on the part of a professional labor leader 
regarded as wicked and sinister. 
The participation of Lewis in politics has been chiefly 
limited to weight-making in the electoral scale. At one time 
in his career, in 1907, he sought hut failed to win a mayoralty 
3 
in Lucas, Iowa. Since then, as head of the miners' union and 
for a time a leading officer of the CIO, with powerful 
-23-
influence, pre sumahly, over the vot e s of hundreds of thousands 
of organized workers, he has g enerally used his p osition in 
the manner traditional in American labor politics, to support 
parties and candidates willing to promote the aims of lab or -
in short, the time-honored principle of quid p ro guo. Lewis 
has he en no more consistent a Democrat than a Repuhlican, 
supporting the latter party in the Twenties, but from 1932 to 
1940 standing firmly in the Democratic camp, and again in 1940 
turning to the Repuhlicans as a supporter of Wendell Wilkie. 
Party allegiance has been determined, in part, by pragmatic 
consideration as to lahor's advantage. Lewis once stated 
his position in this way: 
I am not a Rep ublican, I am not a 
Democrat, I am not a Fascist, a Communist, 
nor a Socialist. I am for lahor and I 
will go with anyone who wil1 work with me 
in this cause. 4 
Lewis and the Early New Deal 
In the early period of the New Deal Lewis was a major 
factor in the formation of national lahor policy. The Great 
Depression having hrought in a favorable administration, Lewis 
saw and s e ized the opportunity for a massive organizational 
advance hy lab or. "By 1932 1 11 he later recounted, "my thinking 
had reached the point where the general p attern of NRA and 
specifically Section 7A hegan to appear as the most important 
single move es sential to op ening the way for a nationwide 
5 
organizational campaign of industrial unionism." According 
-24-
to Lewis' account, when he was invited to testify in the fall 
of 1932 hefore the Senate Finance Committee, which was 
studying the state of the nation's coal mines, Lewis p resented 
a careful study prepared by Jett Hawk, UMW economist, which 
ended with a general outline of the NRA and a specific state-
6 
ment later incorporated into the NRA as Section 7A. The 
UMW report received little attention from the Committee, ~ut 
in the spring of 1933, after the Democratic administration had 
come into office, a conference was held at the home of Bernard 
Baruch in New York City, and at this conference the NRA was 
conceived and shaped. John L. Lewis, the only representative 
of organized labor at the conference said regarding his p art 
in the p roceedings: "I insisted on the inclusion of what later 
came to he known as Section 7A into this piece of legislation. 
7 
I fought for it and got it. 11 He followed this legislation, 
which was shepherded by Senator Wagner, through the Congress, 
determined that this point not be lost in the mill. The 
all-important section, which provided legislative protection 
for labor's right to organize and bargain collectively, was, 
8 
as Lewis put it, "to fertilize the egg of the CIO." 
Section 7A and the other pro-labor measures, for which 
the UMW was to a large extent responsihle, were capital gains 
for lahor, hut they had a price. This benevolent administra-
tion had to be kept in power - and politics was a costly 
husiness. In the hitter campaign of 1936, the UMW was the 
chief contrihutor to the war sinews of the Democratic P arty, to 
9 
the extent of over half a million dollars. This donation, 
though very considerable, the UMW was well able to make, for 
its treasury was fat and its assets fluid; one reason for 
this solvency being the persistent refusal of John L. Lewis 
to tie up union funds in cooperative stores and other ven-
tures such as were frequently advocated by miners and b y 
10 
pro-labor observers outside the union. The union's funds 
were kept in a liquid state, to meet de~ression needs, to 
p rovide for strike periods, and to cover extraordinary 
exigencies such as that presented ~y the 1936 political cam-
p aign. Marquis Childs, speaking of a campaign meeting at 
Harris~urg, Pennsylvania, that year, described Lewis as 
having "a slightly possessive air as though this had heen 
a ~ de Versailles that he had ordered and paid for, as 
11 
inde ed he had." According to Lewis, the press and puhlic 
had no conception of the amounts involved, totalling three 
quarters of a million in that campaign, for in addition to 
the $ 500,000 direct contribution ("the figure named hy the 
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White House 11 ), large sums were also exp ended on organizing and 
electioneering for Roosevelt. The union contributions, made 
"with the explicit understanding of a quid pro guo for lahar," 
g ives p oint to Lewis' statement that 11 the United Mine Workers 
and the CIO have paid cash on the harrel for every p iece of 
12 
legislation that we have gotten. 11 
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The Break Between Franklin D. Roosevelt and John L. Lewis 
This political and financial rap port was maintained 1 
however, only during the period of the Roosevelt-Lewis honey-
moon. Political honeymoons generally follow mariages de 
convenance, which are also prone to dissolve at the convenience 
or either partner. 'l'he 'break 'between Roosevelt and John L. 
Lewis developed gradually, but reached full issue in 1940. 
The cleavage had serious implications; in the judgment of one 
lahor student, it "broke the militant surge of the labor 
13 
movement and broke much of the .New Deal." 
The rift 'between President Roosevelt and John L. Lewis 
resulted 1 according to Lewis, from policy differences that 
hegan with Section 7A of NRA. From the outset of the New Deal 
administration by Lewis' account, the President demonstrated 
his basic lack of sympathy with the workingman and with the 
cause of organized labor; there was a deficiency in the 
President's social philosophy which was the natural result of 
his aristocratic background: "Franklin Roosevelt never under-
stood or had any idea what the working man was any more than 
14 
Franklin D. Roosevelt had ever worked himself for a living." 
While this statement may be somewhat exaggerated, so keen an 
observer and so close a co-worker of President Roosevelt as 
Mrs. Frances Perkins, Secretary of Labor during the New Deal 
era, has written of him: 
There are many things about trade unions 
that Roosevelt never fully understood. 
I doubt that he understood what solidarity 
really means in the trade union movement. 
He tended to think of trade unions as 
voluntary associations of citizens to 
promote their own interests in the field 
of wages, hours, and working conditions. 
He did not altogether grasp that sense of 
their heing a solid bloc of people united 
to one another by unbreakable honda which 
gave them power and status to deal with 
their employers• terms. 15 
It has been asserted by Lewis that his suspicion of 
President Roosevelt began as a consequence of Roosevelt's 
opposition to Section 7A and his repeated efforts to prevent 
the inclusion of this section in the NRA legislation, efforts 
16 
which were Lewis claimed, "most underhanied." This opposi-
tion necessitated the use of tactics which were distasteful 
to John L. Lewis, particularly the use of flattery to reduce 
the President's hostility, flattery whose central theme was 
that Roosevelt was "the great friend of the working man, that 
17 
American laborers were looking to him as their Messiah •••• " 
The resulting distrust remained with Lewis through the 
succeeding years, though in 1936, he gave powerful support to 
the administration. 
It was in 1937, in the course of the new-style strike, 
the "sit-down," which was adopted hy the workers at the 
General Motors plant, that John L. Lewis has claimed he 
discovered "the depth of deceit, the rank dishonesty and the 
18 
double-crossing character of Franklin Delano Roosevelt." 
Far from giving the encouragement and support to which Lewis 
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felt lahor was entitled in view of the aid given in the 1936 
political campaign, Roosevelt remained in the background. In 
the steel strike that soon followed, the disgruntled President 
of the United States delivered his famous speech "a plague on 
b oth your houses" in which he criticized both contestants 
impartially, a sp eech vigorously denounced by Lewis as ill-
hefitting one who 11 has supped at labor•s table and who has 
19 
~een sheltered in labor's house." The above reference was, 
apparently, to the UMW chief 1 s financial and political aid in 
the 1936 election, which, Lewis believed, entitled labor to 
non-intervention and encouragement in its struggles with 
capital and management. This consideration intensified the 
resentment felt by John L. Lewis, whose disaffection had 
already led him to advocate the formation of a third party 
20 
hased on a popular front of labor and farmers; his aim was, 
he said (in a speech at Madison Square Garden on March 15, 
21 
193'7), to free the workers from "industrial servitude" and 
secure them the economic freedom that would enable them to 
exert their potential political power. The break hetween 
John L. Lewis and Franklin D. Roosevelt was, by 193'7, 
virtually complete. 
Though personally disaffected, and although in labor 
strug gles President Roosevelt continued to "equivocate," Lewis 
did not, however, make an open break in 193'7; as he later 
explained, the Administration still had three and a half 
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years in office, and it seemed prudent to appear to go along as 
a Roosevelt aympathizer for the remainder of the second term 
22 
even though in Lewis' opinion the New Deal was already dead. 
The doughty labor leader contained his growing hostility until 
the election campaign of 1940. On Octoher 21, 1940, he 
announced the dramatic hreak with Roosevelt in a speech which 
23 
Rohert Sherwood called "one of the ugliest speeches on record," 
in which John L. Lewis called upon organized labor to vote for 
Wendell Wilkie and vowed he would retire from his position as 
President of the CIO if Roosevelt were reelected, which Lewis 
said he would construe as the equivalent of a vote of no-con-
24 
fidence in himself. 
The campaign and Roosevelt's reelection left a rankling 
antipathy which was deepened in the subsequent crisis of 
mohilization and war. Lewis continued characteristically to 
fi ght for labor gains, was severely criticized by the President 
25 
and replied heatedly to threats of federal intervention 
on the ground of national security. Though after Pearl Harh or 
Lewis promptly made puhlic declaration of the UMW 1 s resolve 
to sup port the nation ' s war effort for the duration and to 
26 
withhold strike action, strikes continued, esp ecially after 
Lewis launched his 1943 offensive, to embitter relations between 
the UMW and the federal government. To such a wide divergence 
had Lewis and the Roosevelt administration arrived during the 
war that in January, 1944 the United Mine Workers Journal 
retracted all credit earlier given to Roosevelt for the social 
reforms of the Thirties, insisting that these, being much 
needed and long overdue, would have resulted out of necessity 
27 
in any case even if there had been no Roosevelt. 
Lewis' Political Amhition 
-30-
Yet there is another aspect to the breach between these 
two powerful figures, one related to considerations other than 
policy differences. The breach may well have developed out of 
conflicting political ambitions. Observers have frequently 
remarked in John L. Lewis a longing for high political office. 
Marquis Childs, for example, stated that in the 1936 campaign 
Lewis "dreamed dreams of imperial grandeur. This was Franklin 
28 
Roosevelt's inning. John L. Lewis would come next." Senator 
Rush Holt, in the same campaign, charged that Lewis was not 
interested in the miners hut only in gaining power for himself, 
29 
specifically the Presidency of the United States. Similarly, 
a. Chicago editor asserted that Lewis and the Roosevelt adminis-
tration had "made a horse trade" in which Lewis agreed to 
support Roosevelt in 1936 in return for the latter's support 
30 
for the nomination in 1940. Another story related by 
Marquis Childs was that in either 1939 or 1940 Lewis proposed 
to President Roosevelt that, a.s the "two most prominent men in 
the nation, 11 together they would make a.n invinci'ble ticket. 
'l'he President wa.s said to have inquired whimsically, "Which 
31 
place will you take, John?" 
Frances Perkins, Roosevelt's Secretary of Labor, has 
thrown new light on Lewis' political aspiration·s. The United 
Mine Workers of America had made a sizeahle loan to the 
.uemocL·atic campaign fund in 1936. Madam Perkins descri bee a 
meeting with John L. Lewis in January~ 193?~ at which~ she 
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relates, Lewis was angry and belligerent because the President 
had not asked to see him. The Secretary of Labor failed to 
soothe Lewis~ who launched into a tirade against President 
Roosevelt in which he used violently abusive language. When 
queried by Madam Perkins as to what reason Lewis felt he should 
have been contacted by the President, Lewis replied: 
•••• when J. P. Morgan was the principal 
contributor to the Republican party he 
certainly had constant access to the 
President and told him exactly what he 
wanted done. The tables are reversed 
now and I expected to be consulted in 
the same way. 32 
This story would seem to indicate that the aim of Lewis' 
political ambition was to occupy a role of chief adviser, a 
sort of hack-stage impresario of national policy. 
An even more significant meeting described by Frances 
Perkins shows a different aspect, however, of John L. Lewis' 
aspirations. Mrs. Perkins and Daniel Tobin of the Teamsters 
Union were discussing with President Roosevelt the possibility 
of a third term. Tobin assured Roosevelt, who declared the 
people would not like a third term~ that the President would 
have the support of labor. This argument amused Franklin D. 
Roosevelt, for it reminded him of an incident which the 
President related, involving John L. Lewis. About two months 
previously, he said, Lewis had discussed the third term 
question with Roosevelt, who expressed his doubts regarding 
the people's attitude toward a third term. Roosevelt told 
Madam Perkins and Tobin that Lewis had proposed a solution of 
the difficulty. Lewis had said: 
Mr. President, I have thought of all that 
and I have a suggestion to make for you 
to consider. If the vice-presidential 
candidate on your ticket should happen 
to be John L. Lewis, those objections 
would disappear. A strong labor man would 
insure full support not only of all the 
labor people but of all the liberals who 
worry about such things as third terms. 33 
Mrs. Perkins recalled that a few days earlier she had spoken 
to Lewis about some forthcoming labor legislation and that he 
had replied, in answer to her question regarding labor support 
for it, that he would rather not commit himself until the 
President had come to some conclusion ahout a suggestion 
34 
recently made to him by ~ewis. The inference she drew was 
that the suggestion mysteriously referred to was that related 
by President Roosevelt, and that Lewis would withhold his 
support until that decision was made. 
In view of the above, Lewis' break with Roosevelt in 
1940 would appear to have been motivated in large part hy 
political factors. Roosevelt had failed the mine leader 
personally, had failed to assist him in his quest for political 
power. it is douhtful whether the American people were or are 
ready to elevate a labor leader, and particularly the iron man 
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of the coal field, to high elective office, hence Levds would 
p roh ahly have weakened rather than strengthened the Democratic 
ticket. In any case, Lewis felt himself to be representative 
of the interests of a broad and powerful portion of the p eople, 
hence entitled, in a democracy, to seek the rewards of power 
and office. In this view he was not without support, according 
to one biog rap her, who stated in 1936 and 1937 p owerful labor 
support was focussing on Lewis: "In both camps of those driving 
toward a new lahor party and those attempting to cap ture the 
Democratic party, John L. Lewis was the only potential presi-
35 
dential candidate." No such movement materialized, and 
without the support of .tt'ranklin D. Roosevelt Lewis' p rospects 
evap orated. Hence on a surprising day in 1940 the gruff 
voice of John L. Lewis rumbled across the nation calling up on 
the workers to preserve the third-term tradition, halt 
Roosevelt's attempt to center all power in himself and throw 
36 
t heir support to the Republican candidate, Wendell Wilkie. 
The disgruntled Lewis remained at odds with succeeding Democratic 
administrations throughout the war and postwar periods. 
Desire for power has heen the driving force in the 
career of John L. Lewis, and his success has heen impressive. 
But it has not fulfilled his dreams. Huey Long , himself no 
mean student of the dynamics of power-seeking, once said of 
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Lewis, "Old Huey thinks t h is John L. will b e the most powerful 
37 
man in America, unless I get there first." The prophecy, 
however shrewd a judgment, has not been fulfilled. Lewis, b y 
driving his UMW like an armored ram against the citadel of 
manag ement and finance, won a commanding position in coal; 
as a l eader in the CIO he spurred the most massive organiza-
tional drive in American labor history; in the New Deal period 
he was instrumental in winning for labor legislative benefits 
of p rime importance. These were mighty achievements and brough t 
increase of power. ~et he failed to acquire high public 
office in which he might wield the political power of the 
Repuhlic. When he sought to enter the Presidency through the 
h ack-door of the Vice-Presidency, and found his aims p itted 
against those of a more masterly politician, his failure cast 
him into a political limbo symbolized by his self-defeating 
liason with the Republican party. His moment had passed. 
Rejected, as he felt, by the more pro-lahor of the two major 
parties, and allied with a p arty in which there was no real 
home for him, his rugged independence and rep eated defiance 
of "general welfare" and "national security" claims completed 
the ruin of his political hopes. In this respect his descent 
into darkness was made final during the post-war reaction, 
though he became more conspicuous than ever in labor struggles, 
and the focus of the anti-labor business counter-offensive. 
The hour is gone and John L. Lewis' aspirations have 
p assed into p olitical midnight. Perhaps the grim warrior could 
not have heen domesticated to democratic p rocess, hut the 
question is merely academic. There is no future in this field 
for Lewis. At some later date the working population may 
elevate a direct representative of their interests to the 
hi ghest seat of power in the land, but certainly not in the 
near future and unquestionably it cannot be the czar of coal. 
To some this may be matter for regret; for Lewis it was his 
personal tragedy. rtere it is merely noted that the asp iration 
was in him, that it may well have been the motive force that 
guided the course of John L. Lewis through these turhulent 
and epochal decades of which he has been so much a part and 
so monumental a figure. 
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Chapter III 
Post-war Reaction: 1946 
In the spring of 1946, with the American economy heing 
converted from a wartime to a peacetime hasis, John L. Lewis, 
following his policy of demanding more and more, launched a 
1 
strike that threatened to disrupt the entire "reconversion" 
effort. This move caused the Government to seize the mines, 
2 
under the authority of the War Labor Disputes Act, and 
resulted in a contract between the Government and the miners. 
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A dispute over the interpretation of this contract precipitated 
a struggle between government and miners that raised a 
challeng e to governmental labor policy. The Truman administra-
tion reacted as if it believed the Lewis demands were made in 
order to emharrass that administration rather than to benefit 
the miners. By his action, Lewis succeeded in antagonizing 
the President, the courts, the Congress, and the puhlic. 
Congress, in a mood of reaction, seized the opportunity to 
enact punitive labor legislation, not only for the United Mine 
Workers of America, but for the entire labor movement. Thus, 
Lewis' union became the focal point of the post-war labor 
movement and the pivot on which reaction turned. 
Whenever the United Mine Workers of America struck, 
John L. Lewis was seen to hold a key position in American 
industry. The order for the miners to cease work meant a 
cessation or slackening of operation for power plants, rail-
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roads, and even tually all major industries. When the miners, 
unahle to reach an agre ement with the mine operators, ~egan a 
work stoppage April 1, 1946, at a critical point in industrial 
recon version, the implications for the American economy were 
considered sufficiently serious to warrant extraordinary inter-
vention hy the Government. The Truman administration utilized 
the War Labor Disputes Act, which was still in effect and 
which empowered the Government to seize plants or mines whose 
operation was considered essential to the national security. 
The times were inauspicious for UMW militancy. The 
puhlic, continually reminded of what had appeared to be John L. 
Lewis' unpatriotic disservices in wartime, was frayed in temper. 
Lewis had declared, at one point during the war, that lahor 
could not accep t a policy "that fattens industry and starves 
3 
lahor, . and then calls upon labor to starve patriotically." 
Nor did Lewis intend that, in the postwar period of inflationary 
pressures on prices and living ~oats, labor would remain 
passively content with earlier gains or neglect any opportunit1· 
for organizational advances. A change had come, however, in 
the national mood, partly as a p roduct of the propaganda mills 
and opinion factories and partly as a result of general 
weariness. A Fortune survey in 1943 had disclosed that 70.6 
p er cent of a cross-section of the American peop le rated 
John L. Lewis as the person most dang erous and "harmful to 
the nation's future unless curhed," a judgment which earned 
4 
him the title of "Nation's Bad Man No. 1." This judgment 
persisted into the postwar period, but at last it appeared 
that something would be done to "curb 11 him. The prevalent 
mood was expressed by Senator Morse of Oregon, in reference 
to the UMW strike of 1946, when he stated "we ••• should write 
into law a distinct policy regarding labor and strikes. 'l'he . 
time has come for us to take a stand to settle this question 
5 
once and for all." 
The situation was one of the most critical in labor 
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history. A long pent-up resentment toward liberal labor laws, 
on the part of Republicans and conservative Democrats, worked 
in the direction of anti-~ew Deal legislation. A series of 
important strikes provided proponents of restrictive legisla-
tion with arguments for their proposals. The miners' strikes 
against orders of the National Defense Mediation Board and the 
War Labor Board, which may have been partly due to Lewis' 
personal hostility toward the Roosevelt administration, to-
gether with railroad, automobile and steel strikes, gave the 
sponsors of anti-union bills an opportunity to arouse emotions 
6 
favoring their aims. Other favoring factors were the 
sharpening issues between the United States and Russia, which 
made Congress extremely sensitive to charges of pro-Communist 
labor leadership; the rivalry between the AFL and CIO which 
p roduced aggravating problems of jurisdictional disputes and 
weakened labor strength in resisting hostile legislation; and 
the relative prosperity of the war and postwar years which 
reduced general interest in progressive legislation and social 
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7 
reform. 
The counter-movement in la~or legislation began in 
1946, when industrial reconversion was seriously threatened 
hy lahor difficulties. President Truman had anticipated labor-
management disputes and asked Congress to require a thirty-day 
cooling-off period and provide fact-finding commissions in 
8 
conflicts affecting the national welfare. Before any action 
was taken the anticipated major strikes hegan to occur in the 
steel, automohile, and electrical-products industries. These 
strikes were settled, but were shortly followed by a strike 
of hituminous coal miners, in which case the government took 
over the mines. When this was followed h~ a strike notice 
on the railroads, Truman intervened with a threat to operate 
the roads with troops, if necessar~, upon which the railroad 
unions yielded; the grim President of the United States, 
appearing hefore Congress on May 25 1 called for emergency 
legislation authorizing him to seize industries with a nation-
9 
wide shutdown and draft strikers into the armed services. 
This unprecedented request for a forced draft of workers in 
p eacetime raised drastic possibilities for the labor movement. 
The p roposal of crisis legislation of a temporary and dubious 
nature was not, however, consonant with the prevailing mood, 
which favored legislation of a mo ~ e long-term and swee p ing 
character. The tide was setting toward the formation of a 
new national labor policy. 
Congress promptl~ responded to the President's request 
• 
• 
with the Case Bill which provided for the postp onement of 
strikes pending mediation 1 a new Federal Mediation Board, and 
fact-finding commissions for public utility disputes. The 
Case Bill was passed hy the House, as amended hy the Senate, 
on May 29, the same day the Senate voted down Truman's 
10 
p roposal. Among its other provisions 1 the Case Bill also 
applied the Anti-Racketeering Act to rohhery or extortion hy 
unions 1 made it a crime for an employer to contrihute to 
a welfare fund administered solely hy a union, deprived 
sup ervisors of their status as emp loyees under the NLRA 1 pro.-
vided for suits on union agreements and the suability of 
unions, and subjected union activities to the anti-trust laws 
and injunctive r elief. The President, finding the bill went 
heyond his request, and disapproving some provisions, vetoed 
the hill. 
Two, at least 1 of the Case Bill's provisions appeared 
to be aimed specifically at the UMW. The UMW had challenged 
the wartime wage p attern, and continued to challeng e wage 
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stahilization efforts after the close of the war. There were, 
however, issues other than wages involved in the union's post-
war offensive. Walkouts in the mines in April 1 1945, won the 
union a new contract emhodying the important provision for 
"portal-to-portal" payment, amounting in effect to a wage 
increase; yet another strike in the fall of that year involved 
not wages hut an attempt to strengthen the UMW by including 
11 
foremen in its ranks. In the face of hitter opposition by 
-42-
the operators and intense puhlic indignation, as well as dis-
content among the rank-and-file miners, Lewis called orr the 
strike, promising to raise the issue at a more favorahle time. 
Another coal crisis ap p eared in the spring of 1946. This time 
the central issue was a health-and-welfare fund, and also 
12 
mine-safety laws. Here Lewis was on stronger ground, for 
health and safety conditions in mining communities have been 
notoriously bad. The welfare fund demanded by Lewis was to 
he p rovided by the payment of a royalty of seven cents on 
each ton of coal mined. Rejection by the operators of pro-
posals for a union-controlled welfare fund and for the applica-
tion of federal safety laws resulted in a walkout on April 1. 
The continuation of this strike, with the failure of mediation 
efforts hy Secretary of Labor Schwellenhach, resulted in an 
acute coal shortage and gave impetus to the Congressional 
agitation which p roduced the enactment of the Case Bill, 
provisions of which harred supervisory personnel from union 
memhership and prohihited employers from contributing to union-
managed welfare funds. These provisions covered the issues 
of ~V strikes of 1945 and 1946. 
The Krug-Lewis Agreement 
As the weeks passed, the coal shortage grew so acute 
that on May 21 the government seized the mines and urged the 
13 
miners to return to work. This failing, a contract was drawn 
up hetween the Government and the UMW and signed by John L. 
Lewis and Secretary of the Interior Julius A. Krug on May 29, 
14 
1946. The provisions of the Krug-Lewis Agreement included: 
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(1) an 18.5 cent per hour wage increase; (2) the establishment 
of two benefit funds; first, a welfare-and-retirement fund of 
5 cents per ton to be jointly administered; second, a medical-
and-health fund to be operated hy the union. Into these benefit 
funds, the companies would pay the money they had been deducting 
from wages for medical and hospital purposes; (3) the increase 
in vacation pay of $ 25 a year, bringing it to 100; (4) the 
establishment of a federal mine-safety code; \5) an agreement 
that hoth sides accept the decision of the National Lahor 
15 
Relations Foard on the issue of the unionization of foremen. 
The Krug-Lewis Agreement, a contract to which the 
operators were not a party, was signed for the period of 
g overnment operation1 which it was expected would end as soon 
as full and stable operation of the mines permitted restoration 
of the coal p roperties to private management. The contract was 
resented by many operators, especially Southern operators, and 
neg otiations for return to private ownership were unsuccessful. 
~n any case the contract resulted in high mining production, so 
that the economic crisis was relieved, and political attacks on 
the Truman administration for its inadequate labor policy were 
blunted. 
The p eace secured by the Krug-Lewis Agreement, a victory 
for the UMW, was, however, to he a temporary one. The 
Government's economic stabilization p olicy was crumhling under 
-44-
attacks hy the National Association of Manufacturers and other 
g roups opposed to continued p rice control. Price control was 
weakened in the summer of 1946 and in Octoher most price 
16 
controls disappeared. With the ahandonment of p rice control, 
g overnmental wage stabilization was likewise ahandoned. A new 
wage pattern was necessary, and Lewis once again sought to 
lead in establishing the pattern. 
Breakdown of the Krug-Lewis Agreement 
The new demands by John L. Lewis in the fall of 1946 
ap p eared to be carefully timed, with three considerations in 
mind: (1) the advisability of negotiating and if necessary 
striking at a time when Congress was not in session, in view 
of Congressional animosity toward Lewis; (2) the greater har-
gaining power the miners possessed in the fall, when coal 
stock piles were more rapidly exhausted; and (3) the fact that, 
just hefore the fall elections, a strike or strike threat would 
he p olitically embarrassing to the Administration. Moreover, 
after his victory in the s p ring in negotiations with the 
Government, another victory may have seemed obtainable to the 
tn~ leader. 
On October 21 Lewis charged the Government with a b r e ach 
of contract with the miners and claimed the contract was 
17 
therehy voided. Specifically, Lewis accused the Government 
of failing to prorate correctly the vacation pay conceded in the 
Krug-Lewis Agreement, and of computing payments into the new 
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welfare-and-retirement fund inaccurately. Lewis called for a 
confere nce to he held on Novemher 1 in order to reop en the 
contract. 
Lewis justified his action hy the terms of the National 
b ituminous Coal Wage Agreement of April 11, 1945, which was 
extended by the Krug-Lewis Agreement. The preservation of 
t h e provisions of the earlier agreement was embodied in the 
first paragrap h of the Krug-Lewis Agreement, which read as 
follows: 
Provisions of the National Bituminous 
Coal Wage Agreement Preserved: 
Except as amended and sup plemented 
herein, this agreement carries forward 
and preserves the terms and conditions 
contained in all joint wage agreements 
effective April 1, 1941, throug h March 
31, 1943, ••• and the National Bituminous 
Coal Wage Agreement dated April 11, 1945. 18 
While the Krug-Lewis Agreement contained no provision 
for termination of contract, there was such a clause in the 
1945 agreement, which stated: 
At any time after March 1, 1946, 
either party may give ten days• notice 
in writing for a desire for a negotiating 
conference upon matters outlined in 
. said notice. The other party agrees to 
said conference. At the end of fifteen 
days after the b eginning of such nego-
tiating conference, either p arty may 
give to the other a notice in writing 
of the termination of this agre ement 
to he effective five days after the 
receipt of such notice. 19 
Lewis held the above clause to have been incorporated 
in the 1946 settlement, and hased his claim for reneg otiation 
20 
upon this p rovision. Secretary Krug, on the other hand, 
declared that t h e 1946 contract covered wages, hours, and 
working conditions during the period of g overnment operation, 
21 
with no provision for any reopening of the contract. The 
position of the miners seemed to he strengthened, however, ~y 
the op inion informally g iven by Attorney General Clark, who 
said in a letter to Krug on Octoher 29: 
This is to advise you that in my opinion 
there is no legal ohstacle to such 
further negotiations, nor is there any 
legal impedime nt to modification of the 
existing context so as to reflect 
changes in wages and other terms and 
conditions of employment.... 22 
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The conference requested by Lewis was held on November 1 
hetween the miners and Coal Mine s Administrator Collison, 
Secretary Krug heing ahsent on a Western tour; the conference 
was unp roductive, and after a week of fruitless me e tings, it 
23 
was agreed to recess until Krug's return. The sole result 
of the conference was to reveal that the UMW complaints 
with regard to computation of payments into the welfare fund 
and for vacations did not cover Lewis' real ohjects. The 
miners p resented to the conference an extensive list of 
24 
demands, centering on wage raises and reduction of hours. 
With the collapse of p rice control and of wage stabilization 
Lewis had d e cided to lead in setting a new wage pattern, 
initiating a new wage rotmd instead of following after the 
other hig unions as he had done in the s pring of 1946. 
ln the meantime, the Attorney General had reversed his 
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earlier judgment and given his opinion that the existing con-
tract covered the entire period of government operation of the 
mines, hence Section 15 of the National Bituminous Coal Wage 
Agreement relating to termination of contract was "no longer 
25 
in force." Krug, on his return to Washington, wrote Lewis 
on November 14 that the miners' proposals were of such a 
"fundamental nature" that they were not within the jurisdiction 
of the government, which was merely an "interim custodian 11 of 
the coal mines, and should be taken up directly with the coal 
26 
operators. Krug, who had already conferred with the operators, 
expressed the conviction that any major change in wages and 
hours would postpone indefinitely the return of the mines to 
their owners and would thwart the desire of all concerned for 
"genuine collective hargaining" in the coal industry. He 
directed Lewis to negotiate with the operators and warned that 
if no agreement was reached hy the end of two months, the 
mines would he returned to the owners and "normal operation 
of economic forces would then prevail." 
Lewis' reply was angry and characteristically florid. 
27 
He reminded Krug that the UMW had a contract with the Government 
and not with the operators, "who have no status under the 
contract." The Secretary was acting, Lewis said, "cavalierly" 
in delivering himself of a 11 ukase 11 ordering negotiation with 
the operators and setting a time limit for agreement; this 
Lewis repudiated as a "sixty-day freeze," a proposal indicative 
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of the Secre tary's wielding to " the hlandishments and soothing 
siren voice of the op erators.n John L. Lewis served notice 
that the Krug-Lewis Agreen1ent would be terminated on Novemher 
20. 
Secretary Krug, in rep ly to the notice given by the 
U~V leader, cited the altered opinion of the Attorney General, 
which, Krug declared, "rules that you are without p ower to 
28 
terminate the contract with the Government." Lewis did not 
answer. As the date neared for the expected strike, President 
Truman heg an to move to prosecute John L. Lewis and the UMW . 
The Government's Position 
Seizure of the mines under the authority of the War 
Lahor Disputes Act of 1943, otherwise known as the Smith-
Connally Act, left the Government in an embarrassing p osition. 
The seizure on May 21 having failed to halt the strike, mine 
op eration was resumed only as a result of the Krug-Lewis 
Agreement of May 29, wherein the Government hargained with the 
UMW and made large concessions in return for coal p roduction. 
The miners, inured to government seizure of the mines by 
several earlier instances under t h e war powers of the g overn-
29 
ment, and fortified hy their triumph in the Krug - Lewis 
Agreement, were more than ready to engag e in hargaining with 
the Government. On the other hand, the Government sought to 
deny or modify its status as employer and sought to shift 
the function of negotiation to the p rivate coal operators. 
Secretary Krug, speaking for the Government, not only 
maintained, on the strength of Attorney General Clark's 
opinion reversing an earlier opinion, that the m£V had no 
power to terminate the contract, but he also attempted to 
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gloss the Government's status as employer and referred to the 
Government's position as merely that of an "interim custodian.u 
The inference drawn by Krug was that "genuine collective 
hargaining" could not subsist between the Government and the 
union. This view was also held hy President Truman, who 
asserted that the Government took no position as to the merits 
of the union ' s demands and declared that they must be referred 
to the operators and miners "for settlement by the process of 
30 
free collective hargaining." 
It may be noted at this point that at the time of the 
Krug-Lewis Agreement no question was raised as to whether 
negotiation for a contract between government and miners 
constituted genuine collective bargaining. That contract, 
moreover, expressly extended and p reserved the terms of a 
contract settled the previous year hetween private ope rators 
and the UMW . The power to bargain collectively in one instance 
would appear to have existed equally in another. Lewis 
p ointed out that, as the private operators had no status 
under the current contract, renegotiation of contract must be 
carried on as between the parties that had joined in that 
contract. The device whereby the Government ap parently sought 
to evade resp onsibility, by taking refuge in its claimed status 
as a merely substitute or interim employer, was repudiated by 
the UMVv, h ut was later to be adop ted hy the Supreme Court in 
supporting the Government's position. 
The attitude of the Administration toward the issue 
raised hy Lewis' demands was undoubtedly not unmixed with 
political considerations. In view of Lewis' personal feud 
with the Roosevelt administration carried over into the 
Truman administration, it was not unreasonable to assume that 
the raising of a strike threat just before the fall elections 
was timed p artly to embarrass the Administration. The 
Truman administration, faced with the likelihood of a 
Xepuhlican drift in the Congressional elections, was anxious 
to save the seats of incumhent Democrats. There were signs, 
such as an attack on a Democratic candidate for re-election 
31 
in West Virginia, of hostile activity by UMW leaders, and 
this activity along with the desire to weaken Repuhlican 
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campaign charges of ineff ectuality in labor relations may have 
influenced Truman's decision to fight Lewis. Similarly, 
Attorney General Glark's reversal of his opinion as to the 
legal p osition of the Government may have been politically 
influenced. 
A further note, of more general implication, may be made 
on the Government's position in this controversy. The funda-
mental source of the Government's embarrass1rent is indicated 
in Krug's statement that the aim of all concerned should be to 
restore the mines to private ownership at the earliest p os s ihle 
time in order to r e turn to "normal operation of economic 
32 
forc e s." The idea tha. t economic forces operate "normally" 
has long oh sessed the orthodox. I t has, more over, confuse d 
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the r e lations of government with the economy, for in the long 
transition from laissez-faire to regulation the continued 
potency of the b elief in the divine right of economic rr forces" 
to autonomy has frequently imp osed arbitrary limits to the 
functions of the political power. 
In the case at is sue, the Government had applied its 
full r egulatory p owers by seizure of the mines hut was 
unwi lling to r e solve an economic crisis by furth er violation of 
theoretical laissez-faire, and instead refused to act as party 
to a wage agreement, maintaining that th e p rimary and 
inviolable contractural r e lationship was between p rivate 
management and lab or; into this relationship the Government 
r e fus e d to mak e further intrusion. 
The Government's argument was rack ed hy all the force of 
individualistic tradition hut was neverth eless incompatib le 
with the logic of its p osition. In a time of crisis, the 
Gove rnment had exercised its authority to seize the mine s, 
thereb y relieving the operators of their managerial f unctions 
and p roviding a forthri ght assertion of a public interest in 
coal p roduction. Having achieved this, the Government 
repudiated the re sponsib ility that developed up on it with its 
rep lac ement of private management, and refused to fulfill 
the log ic of its role in the mines. The position t ak en b y 
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Secretary Krug and President Truman was based on the p remise 
that stabilization in the coal industry would be achieved 
by restoration of the mines to private op eration, an op timistic 
view in the lig ht of mining history. What was needed was a 
constructive attempt to deal with the casual aspects of warfare 
in the mines, rather than palliatives and temp orary expedients 
s uch as seizure. Instea_d, when fac e d with a crisis that might 
result once more in general conflict, the Government a b dicated 
in deference to an economic theory, rejecting the constructive 
possihilities of its position. 
The reliance on temporary and inadequate expedients, in 
an attempt to maintain a half-way house between lais s ez-faire 
and reg ulation, has been characteristic of governmental lahor 
p olicy, and economic policy in general, and has heen its 
g reatest weakness. This weakness, arising out of the conflict 
hetween the puhlic interest and the dogma of economic 
orthodoxy, has characterized democratic government in g eneral 
in the transition to what has been called a "lahoristic" 
33 
society. 
Confusion of policy has been compounded hy the fact 
that the doctrinal positions of lahor and management have not 
heen clearly established. Laissez-faire and regulation have 
heen alternately demanded h7 either party, depending on 
circumstances, the guiding consideration being opportunism 
rather than doctrinal consistency. In the course of lahor 
history, g overnment has interposed no g enuinely balancing 
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influence nor any consistently equitable policy. Major 
industrial conflicts have simply pointed up the inadequacy 
of governmental labor policy. Such was the case in the 1946 
controversy in the coal mine s, in a real sense a test case for 
the g overnment, which was not shielded from the necessity of 
decision hy playing a b y-stander's role but had actively 
committed itself in the industry, therehy assuming a responsi-
hility for implementing industrial peace. 
John L. Lewis, agg ressive chief of one of the most 
powerful and militant unions in the country, persisted, in the 
face of widespread opposition, to drive for lahor gains and 
for power, in the postwar period. Triumphant in major strikes 
in 1945 and 1946, he soug ht in the fall of 1946, with the 
collapse of price and wage stabilization, to lead in setting a 
new wage pattern. His tactless and often r eckless course had 
long made him the most unpopular man in the nation, and in a 
time of mounting reaction he was made the focus of anti-labor 
sentiment. It was widely felt that the time had come to curh 
him. The Democratic administration, driven hy political and 
economic p ressures, was ready to take a stand. The decision 
was announced hy President Truman on Novemher 17, to "fight 
34 
Joh..11. L. Lewis on all fronts." 
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Chapter IV 
The UMW and the Court 
Revival of the Injunction 
A severe economic crisis faced the nation in Novem~er, 
1946, in the event that the coal mines closed down on November 
20, the date given by John L. Lewis for the termination of 
the Krug-Lewis Agreement. Four hundred thousand miners were 
expected to leave the mines, in pursuance of their "no contract, 
no work" p olicy. Secretary of the Interior Krug moved to shore 
up the economy by the drastic step of freezing all bituminous 
1 
coal sup plies. As puhlic opinion hardened, the p rivate coal 
operators, far from seeking a return of the mines to private 
operation at this time, called for a decisive test of streng th 
hetween the Government and the union. One prominent coal 
official said: 
If the Government washes its hands of 
the mines and turns them hack to the 
operators without invoking the Smith-
Connally law it will show that the 
Government is wholly incompetent to 
protect the puhlic. 2 
On November 17 President Truman gave his order to 
3 
the Attorney General "to fight John L. Lewis on all fronts." 
Attorney General Clark the next day requested a restraining 
order against the United Mine Workers of America from Judge 
T. Alan Goldsborough of the Federal District Court in the 
. l 
District of Columbia. The Attorney General filed a series of 
affidavits, signed hy several Cabinet memhers and other 
Government officials, to the effect that a work stoppage 
"wil l adversely affect great p ublic interests and will 
-56-
seriously endanger the public welfare and safety." A temporary 
court order was is s ued r.y Judge Goldsborough restraining Lewis 
and oth er union officials from terminating the Krug-Lewis 
4 
Agreement. 
In his request for a court order enjoining Lewis to 
avert a strike, the Attorney General charged that Lewis' 
notice of termination of contract, to be effective Novemb er 20, 
was 11 in fact and in effect" a call to strike, hence in viola-
tion of the (Smith-Connally) War Labor Disputes Act which 
p rohihited strikes on government-seized facilities. Anticipat-
ing the argument that the Norris-Le.Guardia Act barred use of 
the injunction against a labor union, Clark stated: 
The Norris-LaGuardia Act marked the 
culmination of a fifty-year controversy 
as to the right of workers in private 
employ to organize and hy collective 
means to obtain acceptable terms and 
conditions of employment. 
Specifically it removed the injunc-
tion process from the area of labor 
combat between employer and emp loyee. 
In no sense, however, does the Norris-
LaGuardia Act purport to deal with the 
problem here presented; the invocation 
by the United States of the equitable 
powers of the courts to prevent irreparable 
injury to the interest of the people of 
the United States pending a peaceful 
judicial determination of a legal problem. 5 
The revival of tbe dreaded injunction was a thunde r b olt 
6 
to the whole organized labor movement. It was denounced 
b y the AFL and CIO as a violation of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, 
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which was regarded as an unhreachahle protection to lahor 
against the powerful anti-lahor weapon of the injunction. 
Throughout the country, however, the Government 1 s resort to 
injunction proceedings reportedly received wide puhlic support 
7 
and a uniformly favorahle editorial reaction. There was, 
undoubtedly, vigorous sentiment in the country in favor of a 
showdown fight with John L. Lewis. 
On Novemher 20, the President instructed the Attorney 
General to p ress contempt charges against Lewis and the IDdW 
as the strike became complete and banner headlines declared 
8 
"Lewis Defies Government." In a similar situation in 1919, 
when Attorney General Palmer had obtained an injunction against 
9 
Lewis, the UMW leader had yielded on the ground that he would 
not fight his government, hut in the present case he had 
decided to press the fight. Since Lewis had failed to prevent 
the strike, Judge Goldshorough ordered him to appear on 
10 
November 25 for violation of the restraining order. 
Demands on the part of memhers of Congress for a strong 
stand grew in volume as dwindling coal stocks caused an 
embargo to he placed on all hut essential railroad f reight, a 
cut in steel p roduction, and the imp osition of a general 
ll 
dim-out. Members of both houses of Cong ress urged the 
President to call Congress in special session for anti-strike 
action. Senator Byrd of Virginia keynoted these demands with 
the declaration that "ap p easement of John L. Lewis" must 
end and that too much power had heen yielded by g overnment to 
lahor l eaders, the result being "a labor dictator ship which 
12 
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seriously menaces our future." Senator Joseph Ball of Minnesota, 
a key figure in shaping the Repuhlican labor p rogram for the 
new vongress elected that fall, asserted that the Government 
might be compelled to "me e t the challenge by smashing not only 
Mr. Lewis hut the United Mine Workers as well." Similarly, 
Representative Harold w. Smith of Virginia, co-author of the 
Smith-Connally Act, called for action to "quell the dictator-
ship of John L. Lewis and a few others." Truman was blamed 
for the situation b y Representative Charles Halleck of 
Indiana, a p rincipal in the drafting of the Case Bill, due to 
the President's veto of that lah or legislation. The anti-New 
Deal animus that underlay much of the criticism expressed in 
the dispute was typified by the statement of Representative 
Clarence Brown of Ohio that, "The New Deal chickens have come 
home to roost." Strong measures were in the air. Among the 
suggestions circulated among Congressmen and government 
officials was reported to he a p roposal to charge the UMW with 
13 
b eing a monop oly and seek its dissolution hy the courts. 
In any event, Senator Taft of Ohio predicted that the new 
14 
Re puhlican Congress would act vigorously to stop strikes. 
The judicial wheels continued to grind. Summoned hefore 
Judge Goldshorough on November 25, the UMW argued that as 
Lewis had taken no action after sending the cancellation notice 
on Novemher 15, there had be en no violation of the restraining 
order, which need not have been ob eyed in any case due to its 
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illegality. Judge Goldshorough, on the contrary, reg arded the 
occurrence of the strike at the date s et for termination of 
contract as sufficient evidence of a p ositive action in 
violation of the restraining order, and he h e ld, moreover, 
that the Norris-LaGuardia Act prohiriting use of the injunction 
15 
was inapplicahle in the pre s ent case. In his holding Judg e 
Goldsh orough referred to the ancient p rinci p le of Eng lish l aw 
that the king could do no wro ng , and to Black's vene r able text 
stati ng that the Government was not hound hy any enactment 
exc ep t when exp res s ly mentione d in the enactment, which was 
not done in the Norr is-LaGuardia Act. The Judge denied a 
motion to dismiss the contemp t charg es and on Novemher 29 
Lewis and the United Mine Workers were ordere d to stand trial 
for contemp t. 
On Decemh.er 3, Judge Goldsboroug h found Lewis and the 
United Mine Workers guilty of civil and criminal contempt and 
laid the unp r e cedented fine of $ 3,500,000 on the union and 
17 
~10,000 on Lewis. Goldsborough termed the strike "an evil 
demoniac monstrous thing ••• a threat to democratic g overnment. 11 
Judge Goldsb orough signed a temp orary injunction which 
continue d the restraining order in effect until the determina-
tion hy high e r courts of the v a lidity of the Krug -Lewis 
Agreement. Lewis, sp eaking for himself, the UMW , and the 
entire organized labor movement, declared that th e p roc e eding s 
had violated the democratic ri ghts of the miners and the 
exp r e ss guarantees of the Norris-LaGuardia Act. He descrih ed 
the action i n this case as "the ugly recrudescence of 
18 
' g overnment b y injunction•." 
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On Decemher 7 Lewis dramatically call ed off the strike, 
s tating as his reason a desire to allow the Supreme Court, 
to wh ich a ppeal had hee n taken, to weig h the a pp eal free from 
pres sure, and his wish to p revent national injury through 
19 
coal shortag es. He ordered the miners to work until Ap ril 1, 
1947. As the miners returne d to work and the dim-out was 
lifted, it b ecame clear that Lewis had be en defeated. The 
Government had won a victory in court but hy the r evival of 
an outlawed weap on, with p otentially disastrous consequenc e s 
for organized lab or in America. 
Defeat in the Supreme Court 
The issue concerning the injunction then rested squarely 
upon the United States Sup r eme Court, which p romp tly revi ewed 
the case. On March 6, 1947, the Sup reme Court decide d a gainst 
Lewis and the United Mine Workers , hut demonstrated sharp 
20 
disagreement in its ranks hy the diversity of its opinions. 
Six op inions were written by memb ers of the Sup reme Court. 
The majority held the miners to be at fault in failing to ob ey 
a r e straining order p ending a decision b y the lower court on 
its own jurisdiction, hence were punishable for contempt of 
court. 'l'he Supreme Court decision, however, reduced the fine 
imp osed on the Unit ed Mine Workers from $ 3,500,000 to $700,000, 
while t h e fine of $ 10,000 on John L. Lewis was uph eld. The 
opinion of the Court was delivered hy Chief Justice Vinson, 
with Justices Murphy and Rutledge dissenting and Justices 
Black, Frankfurter, Douglas and Jackson dissenting in part. 
The Limits of the Norris-LaGuardia Act 
The question of first importance was that of the 
applicahility of the Norris-LaGuardia Act of 1932, hanning 
injunctions in labor disputes, to this case. The Court 
divided 5 to 4 on this question. Chief Justice Vinson con-
tended that the government was exempt from the limitations on 
injunctions imposed by that act and hy the earlier Clayton 
Act, hut added that even if the Norris-LaGuardia Act upset 
the p reliminary injunction issued Decemher 4, the criminal 
contempt p roceedings for disobedience of the original 
restraining order would still hold. 
The op inion rendered by Vinson appeared to be based on 
considerations of national exigency. He held that Lewis' 
p olicy was "the germ center of an economic paralysis" extend-
ing throughout the nation•s industries, and termed Lewis' 
conduct 11 an attempt to repudiate the instrument of lawful 
g overnment in the very situation in which governmental action 
21 
was indispensable." Chief Justice Vinson, like Judge 
Golds~orough, also turned to ancient English legal princi p les 
and to Black's Law Dictionary as he p ointed to "an old and 
well-known rule that statutes which in general terms divest 
p re-existing rights or privileges will not be applied to the 
-61-
22 
sovereign without express words to that effect." 
The defendants relied not on any abstract canon or 
general rule of law hut on s pe cific provisions of the 
Norris-LaGuardia Act, particularly sections 4 and 13 1 which 
were said to he misconstrued by the Court. Section 4 of 
that ~ct states: 
No court of the United States shall 
have jurisdiction to issue any restrain-
ing order or temporary or permanent 
injunction in any case involving or 
growing out of any labor dispute to 
prohihit any per son or persons p arti-
cipating or interested in such dispute 
(as these terms are herein defined) 
from doing singly or in concert, any 
of the following acts: 
(a) ceasing or refusing to p erform 
any work or to remain in any relation 
of employment.... 23 
Section 13 defined the above terms, as follows: 
When used in this Act, and for the 
purpose of this Act 
(a) A case shall he held to involve 
or to grow out of a labor dispute when 
the case involves per sons who are engaged 
in the same industry, trade, craft, or 
occupation; or have direct or indt rect 
interests therein; or who are emp loyees 
of the same employer; or who are mem~ers 
of the same or an affiliated organization 
of employers or employees •••• 
(b) A p erson or association shall he 
held to be a person participating or 
interested in a lahar dispute if relief is 
sought against him or it, and if he or it 
is engaged in the same industry, trade, 
craft, or occupation in which such dispute 
occurs, or has a direct or indirect inter-
est therein, or is a member, officer, or 
agent of any association composed in whole 
or in part of emp loyers or employees 
engaged in such industry, trade, craft or 
occupation. 
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(c) The term 'labor disp ute' includes 
any controversy concerning terms or condi-
tions of emp loyment, or concerning the 
association or re presentation of persons 
in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, 
changing, or seeking to arrang e terms or 
conditions of employment, r e g ardless of 
whether or not the dis putants stand in the 
p roximate relation of employer and employee. 
(d) The term ' court of the United States' 
means any court of the Unit e d States whose 
jurisdiction has heen or may be conferred 
or defined or limited hy Act of Congress, 
including the courts of the District of 
Columbia. 24 
Chief Justice Vinson in his interpretation of these 
sections of the act emphasized the nature of the parties 
involved, and concluded that the limitations imp osed did not 
a pply to the Federal Government. He stated: 
Every one of these qualifications ••• 
we think relates to an economic role 
ordinarily filled hy a private indivi-
dual or corporation, and not by a 
sovereign government. None of them is 
at all suggestive of any part played 
hy the United States and its relation 
with its own employees. We think that 
Congress failure to refer to the United 
States or to specify any role which it 
might commonly be thought to fill is 
strong indication that it did not intend 
that the Act should apply to situations 
in which the United States appears as an 
emp loyer. 25 
The Chief Justice based his view partly on discussion 
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of the Norris-LaGuardia bill in Congress in 1932. Representa-
tive Blanton of Texas had p roposed that exception in limiting 
the injunctive power be made where the United States Government 
was the petitioner. Representative LaGuardia, co-author of 
the bill, ob jected, however, that such an exception was 
unnecessary, saying "I do not see how in any possible way the 
United States can be brought in under the provision of the 
26 
bill." Vinson also pointed to statements by Representative 
Michener, a member of the Judiciary Committee which reported 
the Norris-LaGuardia bill to the House. Representative 
Michener had said the hill did not attempt to legislate con-
cerning government employees, and that he did not believe the 
enactment of the bill would divest the Federal Government of 
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the right "to seek and obtain injunctive relief where the same 
27 
is necessary for the functioning of Government." Later 
Michener had added: 
This deals with labor disputes hetween 
individuals, not where the Government 
is involved. It is my notion that 
under this bill the Government can 
function with an injunction if that 
is necessary in order to carry out 
the purpose of the Government. I should 
like to see this clarified, hut I want 
to go on record as saying that under 
my interpretation of this bill the Federal 
Government will not at any time be pre-
vented from applying for an injunction, 
if one is necessary, in order that the 
liovernment may function. 28 
In the division on this question, four justices agre ed 
with Vinson, but Justices Rutledge, Murphy, Jackson and 
Frankfurter dissented. The dissent of Justice Frankfurter, 
29 
an acute student of the history of the labor injunction, was 
p articularly significant. Justice Frankfurter, referring to 
the canon drawn by Judge Goldshorough and Chief Justice Vinson 
from Black's Law Dictionary, asserted that no abstract canon 
of construction should be applied in this p articular case, 
that attention should instead he focused on the specific 
orig ins and definite purposes of the act in question. 
Justice Frankfurter denied Chief Justice Vinson's 
assump tion that th e construction of the Norris-La.Guardia Act 
dep ended on the character of the parties involved. The whole 
aim of the Act was, in Frankfurter 1 s view, 11 to define and 
limit the jurisdiction of the courts sitting in equity. And 
as such its p urpose is not to deal with the nature of p arties 
30 
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~ut rather th e p ower of the courts. 11 Congress, he said, was 
concerned with the withdrawal of power from the federal courts 
to issue injunctions in a defined class of cases, and nothing 
in the Act remotely hinted that the withdrawal of this p ower 
turned on the character of parties. In fact the ability of 
the courts to issue injunctions was restricted, he stated, 
11 reg ardless of Vihether or not the disputants stand in the p roxi-
mate relation of employer and employee. 11 Frankfurter cited 
section 13 ta) of the Act as p roof that the limitation on the 
jurisdiction of the court depended entirely on the subject 
matter of the controversy. Drawing on his thorough familiarity 
with the history of the labor injunction, Justice Frankfurter 
concluded, regarding the bearing on the present case of the Act 
under consideration: 
The t ext, context, content and historical 
setting of the Norris-LaGuardia Act all 
converge to indicate the unrestricted 
withdrawal by Congress from the federal 
district courts of the power to issue 
injunctions in labor dis putes, excepting 
only under circumstances exp licitly 
define d and not here present. The meaning 
which a reading of the text conveys and 
which is confirmed b y the history which 
led Congress to free the federal courts 
from entanglements in these industrial 
controversies throug h use of the injunc-
tion, ought not to be sub ordinated to 
an abstract canon of construction that 
carries the residual flavor of the days 
when a personal sovereign was the law-
maker. 31 
ln arriving at his judgment as to the law, Justice 
Frankfurter undertook to disp ose of or rather releg ate to 
p roper p roportions the support to be derived from the st a te-
ments b y Cong ressional members referred to hy Vinson as 
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revealing the intent of the law-makers. These stat ements were 
dismissed by Frankfurt e r as heing hased in p art on misunder-
standing, and in any case irrelevant since they did not 
accord with the express p rovisions of the b ill as actually 
enacted. The statements by Re p resentative Michener as s umed 
p recisely the claim made by the Government in requesting the 
Dehs injunction in 1894, namely that it be granted in order 
that the Government might function, and in so far as Mich ener's 
stat ements indicated a belief that the United States could 
ag ain ohtain a Debs injunction, Frankfurter remarked, this 
view was helied hy the whole history of the leg islation, as 
reflected in its terms. Regardless of the views exp res s ed by 
Michener and LaGuardia, Cong ress had enacted a law which wa s 
incompatihle with those vi ews. To as s ume a different inter-
pretation on the basis of detached p er s onal comments was, in 
effect, to perform an improp e r act of amendment. Justice 
Frankfurter's conclusion was trenchant: 
The remarks of Mr. LaGuardia and Mr. 
Michener ought not to be made the equiva-
lent of writing an amendment into tbe 
act. It is one thing to draw on all 
relevant aids for shedding lig ht on 
the dark places of a statute. To 
allow explicit remarks in th e give-
and-take of debate to contradict the 
very terms of legislation and the 
history behind it is to put out the 
controlling light and meaning shed 
b y the explicit p rovisions of the Act 
in its setting. 32 
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The Court, however, b elieved otherwise, and b y the close 
decision of 5 to 4 that the Norris-LaGuardia Act was not 
controlling in this case, reviv ed the pos sibility of ' govern-
ment b y injunction, 1 long the dread of the American lahor move -
ment. Frankfurt er, in his book on the subject, had stat e d, 
r e g arding the failure to d evelop an e quitab le public policy 
toward lab or conflicts: "'l'h e injunction is . merica• s distinc-
tive contribution in the app lication of law to industrial 
33 
strife." It had b een demonstrat e d once again that this 
instrument could again b e made to do service, under p res sure 
of pub lic exi gencies, in lieu of a more rational and equitable 
p olicy. 
The War Labor Disputes Act in Relation to the U1ffl Case 
Closely relat ed to t h e question of the app licah ility 
of the Norris-LaGuardia Act was a question as to the status 
of Government and miners under the War Lahor Disp ut e s Act of 
1943, under whose authority the mines had been seized. Vins on 
and the majority of the Court regarded Uovernment and miners 
as heing in the relation of employer and employees. Without 
this assumed relation there would have bee n no basis for 
seeking an injunction. The Norris-LaGuardia Act had, inde ed, 
exp ressly closed off injunctive relief to an employer, but 
while the Court regarded the uovernrnen t in this case as 
employer, the Government was declared to be exemp t from the 
p rohirition imposed on private employers. The question of 
status of the parties was not, however, a closed one, as was 
indicated in the dissenting opinions. 
Justice Frankfurter pointed out that the War Lahor 
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Disputes Act, despite the critical time in which it was enact e d, 
made no p rovision for injunctive relief as a remedy for inter-
ference with the Goverrunent's operation of these plants. If 
such proposals were raised or intended, yet the actual form 
of the Act emhodied no p rovision of that nature. Frank furter 
referred, mor eover, to a discussion in Gongress in which 
Senator Thomas of Utah asked Senator Connally, sponsor of the 
bi ll, and others connected with the bill, whether the statute 
would in any way allow a re-opening of the courts to lab or 
disputes. Senator Connally, speaking for himself and other 
memhers connected with t he bill, replied that: 
••• there is no jurisdiction whatever 
conferred hy this h ill providing for 
resort to the united States district 
courts, excep t the one mentioned by 
the Senator from Connecticut, which 
is merely the right to go there for 
civil action for damages, and no 
jurisdiction whatever is given over 
labor disputes. 34 
The hill was enacted with no sp ecial allowance of injunctive 
reli e f for the Government. If, therefore, Congress did not 
provide, even in time of war, this legal resort for the 
Government in the vvar Lahor Disputes Act, it was hardly likely 
that such remedy could he found in the earlier Norris-LaGuardia 
Act, the specific purpose of which was to restrict the courts 
in regard to that particular power. If there was some douht 
as to whether the riorris-LaGuardia Act was applicable to the 
United States, the question would seem to have been ans we r ed 
by the passage of the later act which involved the Government 
as a party yet did not provide it with injunctive relief. 
Justice Frankfurter also contended with regard to the 
War Labor Disputes Act, that there was no basis for considering 
the Government and miners to be in the relation of emp loyer 
and employees. He cited a statement by Under-Secretary 
of War Patterson in which that administrator referred to the 
Government as: 
••• a receiver that would ~e charged with 
the continuity of operation of the plant. 
J.~othing in the Act authorizing seizure of 
private plants indicates that the employees 
of these plants were to be considered 
employees of the United States in the usual 
and natural meaning of the term. 35 
Frankfurter, taking up the analogy with receivership, pointed 
out that, in the case of the railroads and other industries in 
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receivership under op eration by the rederal courts, injunctions 
did not issue in disputes involving emp loyee s or those indus-
tries, hence nothing either in the statute or hy inrerence 
could he round to warrant allowing is sue of an injunction in 
disputes involving employees or mines or other p lants in 
"receivership ! under the Secretary or the Interior. 
Chier Justice Vinson, in holding that the miners were 
emp loyees or the ~ederal Government, hence subject to the 
injunctive power, cited the Krug-Lewis Agreement 1 to which 
the p rivate mine operators were not a p arty. He stressed the 
ract that the provisions or the Agre ement "relate to matters 
which normally constitute the subject matter or collective 
36 
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hargaining ." Consequently, the negotiation or such a contract 
by the miners with the Government indicated that the miners 
considered the uovernment to be the bona ride emp loyer. The 
Chier Justice overlooked the ract, however, that when Lewis 
asked ror a reopening of contract and rurther negotiations 
concerning wages and hours, Secretary Krug replie d that the 
Government was merely the "interim custodian" of the mines, and 
that further negotiations could only be transacted with the 
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coal op erators and owners. The Government refused to parti-
cipate in collective bargaining and in fact denied that 
negotiation betwe en itself and the union would constitute 
11 g enuine collective bargaining." This might he construed as 
heing in a real sense a denial by the ~overnment of any status 
as employer. 
Justice Murphy, who believed like .t<'rankfurter, that it 
was a fiction to maintain that the Government was the employer, 
termed Government ownership and operation a "temporary gloss." 
The case, he contended, was essentially a private labor 
dispute which, under the Norris-LaGuardia Act, could not be 
enjoined. No analogy could properly be found b etween the 
employees of a seized industry under the War Labor Disputes 
Act and the regular employees of the Government. Murphy 
declared, "They (the miners J bear no resemhlance whatever to 
the employees of the executive departments, the independent 
38 
agencies and other hranches of Government." 
"Hybrid Proceedinga 11 
The defendants in tbe case of United States ~ United 
Mine Workers of America contended that J·udge uoldsborough of 
the District Court of Columbia had co-mingled civil and 
criminal contempt, hence they charged error in the procedural 
aspects of the trial. It was maintained Phat the defendants 
had heen deprived of the p rocedural safeguards of distinct 
notice of and prosecution for criminal as distinct from civil 
contempt. ~o ob jection was raised regarding the propriety of 
the charge pres sed by the Government -for civil contempt, of 
which due notice was given, hut it was alleged that Judg e 
Goldsborough had failed to give the required notice of a 
charge of criminal contempt and had also failed to distinguish 
hetween the penalties imposed for civil and for criminal 
contempt. 
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The Court divided 7 to 2 on this question, against the 
claim of the defendants. In delivering the majority opinion, 
Chief Justice Vinson held that there had been no error. 
Referring to 18 U.S.C.A. #687 Rule 42, which laid down the 
procedure for notice and hearing on a contempt charge, Vinson 
held that notice stating the essential facts constituting the 
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contempt charge had heen given in compliance with the rule. 
A violation of the outstanding restraining order was charged, 
and the affidavit clearly and in detail stated the failure of 
the defendants to revoke the notice of ~ovember 15 which had 
led to cessation of work in the mines. The defendants, then, 
had been properly and fully informed as to the causes and 
actions for which contempt was charged. On the other hand, 
the defendants claimed that nowhere was the contempt stated to 
be criminal, as required by Rule 42. Chief Justice Vinson did 
not deny that this requirement had not heen observed. He 
concluded, however, that, despite lack of foi'l!lal notice 
specifying criminal contempt, the defendants were aware of the 
nature of the charge. He pointed out that in the defendants' 
motion to discharge and vacate the rule to show cause the 
defendants had referred to the contempt charged as criminal. 
Therefore, there was no basis for complaint that the mere 
omission of the words "criminal contempt" from the petition 
and the rule to show cause was prejudicial error. Chief 
Justice Vinson held, consequently, that the trial was not 
"diluted" by the co-mingling of civil and criminal contempt. 
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Such procedure was, on the other hand, d eclared by 
Justice Rutledge, in his dis senting opinion, to be p r e judicial 
and in direct contradiction of constitutional guarantees and 
the American system of law. Rutledge descrihed as "shocking" 
the idea "that a criminal prose.cution and a civil suit for 
damages or equitable relief could be hashed together in a 
sing le criminal-civil hodge p odge," for American law had 
totally rejected the European system of compounding criminal 
40 
p roceedings with civil adjudication. Rutledge feared that 
the lump ing together of civil and criminal contempt might prove 
a dangerous precedent, for "if it can be done at all, not 
simp ly a loophole but a very breach has been left in the wall 
of p rocedural protections thrown around the citizen's punish-
41 
ment for crime." 
Justice Rutledge's dissent on this question was hased 
on the heli e f that sp eci fie constitutional p rovisions had 
heen violated. The Sixth Amendment of the Constitut i on of 
the United States guarantees certain rights to the a ccused in a 
criminal p rosecution, including the right "to be informed of 
the nature and cause of the accusation." Rutledge maintained 
that if civil and criminal contempt are co-mingled, the 
defendant is not p roperly informe d of the charge against him, 
42 
and is therefore deprived of a constitutional ri ght. 
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"Hybrid Penalties" 
The procedural obscurity questioned by the defendants 
and by dissenting Justices Murphy and Rutledge, was reflected 
in the penalties imposed. The fine of $ 10,000 imposed upon 
Lewis was held by the Supreme Court not to be excessive. The 
fine of $ 3,500,000 imposed upon the United Mine Workers of 
America by the District Court of Columhia was found by the 
majority of the Supreme Court to be not in keep ing with the 
Eighth Amendment of the Constitution, which forhade "excessive" 
fines. No distinction had been made, however, hetween the 
fine for civil contempt and the fine for criminal contempt, the 
two heing lumped together in a comhined penalty. 
Concerning the punishment for civil contempt, Justice 
Rutledge, in dissent, pointed out that the District Court 
"made no findings whatever concerning the amount of civil 
damages sustained, even if it could be assumed that there was 
43 
evidence to sustain such findings. 11 The indiscriminate 
lu.mping of the two fines together, without finding s of fact 
and without the guide of precedent, led to t h e imp osition of a 
sum, whether large or small, which must he wholly arhitrary. 
Punishment for criminal contempt, which is an offense 
against the court rather than the civil suitor, is left to the 
discretion of the court, which must take into consideration 
the gravity of the offense and its p ossible consequences. 
The majority of the Supreme Court agre ed with Judge 
Goldshorough's decision that the defendants were guilty of both 
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civil and criminal contempt. The Supreme Court, however, 
reduced the fine on the United Mine Workers to $700,000 which, 
Chief Justice Vinson said, ''would not be excessive a punish-
44 
ment for the criminal contempt theretofore committed." 
According to this statement, the Supreme Court considered the 
fine to he for criminal contempt only. Yet no such distinction 
had been made as apportionment of the fine for each offense. 
While the sums differed, the high court's designation of 
penalty would appear to be as arhitrary as that of the inferior 
court. 
Neither the original fine nor the fine as reduced by 
the Supreme Court appeared to be fixed according to any clear 
criterion. This was indicated by the fact mentioned by 
Rutledg e, that precedent for a fine of such p rop ortions could 
he found only in cases of treason, which was not the charge 
45 
in this case. The Supreme Court was aware of the unusual 
proportions of the fines, hut it mi ght he said that these 
were proportional not so much to an unlawful act, as to an 
abstract threat to constitutional g overnment. The requirement 
of the Ei ghth Amendment of the Constitution that fines must 
not he excessive is an indeterminate one, and it was not clear 
on what hasis in precedent or law the Court arrived at the 
fine imposed on the defendants. As Justice Rutledg e p ointed 
out, if the defendants had heen charged with violation of the 
War Labor Disputes Act under which the Government had seized 
the mines, and if they had be e n given all the procedural 
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safeguards of criminal prosecution, the maximum fine would have 
heen 5000. Regarding the conduct of the trial, Rutl e dg e 
concluded: 
When hyhrid proceedings can p roduce 
hyhrid penalties, concealing what is for 
punishment and what remedial, wh at criminal 
and what civil, and in the process can 
discard constitutional procedural protec-
tions against just such consequences, as 
convenience or other wholly discretionary 
impulse may command, then indeed to the 
extent we allow this will we have adopted 
the continental tradition of the civilians 
and rejected our own. 46 
47 
Justice Murphy flatly termed the fines "vindictive. 11 
The significance of the court decision in the miners' 
case was far-reaching. Justice Murphy asserted in his dissent 
that the "imp lications of today 1 s decision cast a dark cloud 
48 
over the future of labor relations in the United State s." 
In his opinion, an aggressive labor leader had disregarded 
a void order and the judicial process was being converted by 
the majority opinion "into a weap on for misapplying statutes 
according to the grave exigencies of t he moment. 11 The 
unwarranted revival of the injunction raised, Murphy believed, 
ominous possibilities; he warned: 
If seizure alone justifies an injunction 
contrary to the expressed will of Congress, 
some future government could easily 
utilize seizure as a subterfuge for hreaking 
any or all strikes in private industries. 49 
For many years Lewis had employed the nationwide strike, 
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• 
• 
and though during the war period mines were seized by the 
Government on five occasions no attempt was made by the Govern-
ment, prior to November, 1946 1 to impose penalties up on the 
50 
union for its actions. The decision handed down by the 
Supreme Uourt on March 6, 1947, later reinforced by the terms 
of the '!'aft-Hartley Act, seemed to presage the recurrence of 
legal ahuses which had been long supp ressed. Other unions, in 
addition to the United Mine Worker s of America, might fall 
afoul of the new judicial interpretation. The decision 
provided a favorable climate for a conservative Congress in 
which to construct anti-labor legislation • 
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The Taft-Hartley Act and the UMW 
John L. Lewis and the United Mine Workers of America 
have long heen a powerful force in shaping lahor legislation. 
They wielded great influence on the pro-lahor legislation of 
the New Deal period. oreover, their strikes during wartime 
were directly responsible for the passage of the (Smith-
1 
Connally) War Labor Disputes Act of 1943. That Act, the first 
of the control laws, was largely aimed at Lewis. Senator 
Connally, co-author of the bill, revealed this when he referred 
in Congress to the declaration by Lewis that the UMN leader 
did not regard his wartime no-strike agreement with the ~overn-
ment as binding; Connally stated: 
I determined then that if I could g et 
this bill before the Senate I was g oing 
to hring it up and press it in order that 
if he did disregard the agreement, the 
President or the Government of the United 
States would have a weapon with which to 
me et the threat and the danger. 2 
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The attitude indicated in this statement was even more marke d in 
the Republican-dominated Congress sitting at the time the 
Supreme Court delivered its opinion in the case of the United 
States ~United Mine Workers of America. The forces making 
for a re-shap ing of national labor policy were in the asc endant 
in 1947, and once again John L. Lewis and the UMW p rovided the 
ostensible motive and reason for a major legislative action. 
The Movement of Opinion 
Nothing had occurred in the p ostwar p eriod to alter 
for the better the adverse judgment by 70 p er cent of the 
American p eople as revealed in the Fortune survey of 1943. 
The UMW , long a "wage and hour" organization, regan at the 
close of World War II to strike out into the field of social 
welfare, and won, while the mines were in Government hand s in 
1946, a great welfare fund. Subse quently Lewis and the UMYv 
went on to win a sizeable increase in the fund and to achieve 
a cardinal triumph by winning in 1948 a pension for the miners. 
While advancing into the field of social welfare, the UMW 
continued in pursuance of its wag e-and-hour tradition to seek 
higher wages and to reduce the long work week in the coal 
mine s. In 1946, with the collap se of p rice and wag e stah ili-
zation, Lewis and his union soug ht to take the l e ad among 
major labor organizations in setting a new wage p attern for 
American industry. 'I'he UMW 1 s postwar offensive reinforced 
the widesp read hostility already engendere d h.y that union and 
its p owerful chieftain. 
The 1946 wage drive, launched at the very time economic 
controls were b eing a b andoned, p rovided opp onents of John L. 
Lewis wit h the new argument that Lewis' p olicy would p r e cipi-
tate an inflationary s p iral. This view was larg ely p ropag ated 
in the pre ss at the time of the Novemh er wage and hour strike 
3 
in 1946. For example, the New York Times pointed out that 
the bituminous mines supplied 55 per cent of the nation's 
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industrial energy, 62 per cent of the electrical power, and 
95 p er cent of the locomotive power, and the p a p er stated that 
a rise in the p rice of coal would be dup licated in the 
price structure of industries dependent on coal; the unex-
plaine d imp lication being that a 15 p er cent rise in miners 1 
wag es must p roduce not only a 15 per cent rise in coal prices 
hut the same p ercentage increase in related industries, where-
as the cost of coal consumed by these industries did not hear 
the same relation to total cost as did a wage increase to the 
cost of mining coal. The current theory that the inflationary 
pressure was wage-based p laced the responsihility for infla-
tion on the demands of organized labor, a responsibility which 
was focused at the moment on John L. Lewis. This attitud e was 
typified by the New York Times, which said: 
It is doub tful if history p rovides anothe r 
case in which one man, by virtue of circum-
stances and his own strategic p lace, was 
ever before in such a p osition to set in 
motion the forces of inflation, and was 
prepared to do so, as Mr. Lewis is at 
this moment. It is an appalling picture, 
if ever there was one, of concentrated 
power and irresponsibility. 4 
Beyond the immediate question of the inflationary 
menace was a larger question involving the function of the 
c entral authority in the hody p olitic. The journal cited 
ahove asserted that the "issue of which John L. Lewis is today 
the sym'hol" was the "simple and clear-cut issue of whether 
the int erest of any one group in our society shall h e placed 
5 
ahove the puhlic interest as a whole." This trenc h ant over-
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simplification which, however, neglected to state that labor's 
opposite numl"'ler had simp ly been more effective in its public 
relations and more successful in identifying its sp ecial 
inter ests with the 11puhlic interest," led to the conclusion 
that the maintenance of an equilibrium betwee n the various 
elements in society was the resp onsibility of the Government as 
the re~res entative of the whole p eop le. Translated into con-
crete terms, this was stated to mean that the Government "must 
overhaul its lahor laws in such a way that lahor and manag ement 
6 
can meet at the conference tahle on equal terms." The argu-
ment, hased on the view that labor had become too strong, for 
an equalization of bargaining power as between lahor and 
management, was widely exp ressed in t h e press, and was the 
p remise of the (Taft-Hartley) Labor-Management Relations Act 
of 1947. 
Among organized groups pressing for a reform in national 
lahar policy, the leading role was p layed b y the National 
ssociation of Manufacturers, the "most uncompromising champ ion 
7 
of emp loyer prerogatives." The militancy of employers had 
increased in the later years of the war, and after the close 
of the war emp loyer policies were agg ressively promoted by the 
NAM as the spokesman for management before Congress. Having 
succeeded by 1946 in securing sp e edy removal of wartime 
g overnmental ' controls and wage-price controls, there was, as a 
lahar analyst has said, a "p rogram shift ••• from g etting g overn-
S 
ment out of industry to getting it into labor." 
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i 'he scope of the program advocated hy emp loyer g roups 
was indicated by a rep ort published b y the NAM in 1 946 1 which 
a ttacked the ( Wagn er) Na tional Lab or Relations Act of 1935 1 the 
Norris-LaGua rdia Act of 1932 and the Wag es and Hours Act o f 
9 
1938. 1'he r eport stat e d that since the enactme nt of the 
Na tional Lab or Relations Act the numh e r of strik es had 
increased thr ee fold, r e aching a p eak in 1946 1 a condition which 
was b lamed on the lack of restraints on union activity in 
that Act, which had the effect of encouraging strike s and 
unre st. The inadequacy of the NLRA was demonstrat e d b y the 
Act's detailed descri p tion of unfair lab or p ractic e s p rohi h ited 
to employers hut the lack of p rovisions as to unfair practices 
of lahor unions. Since the passage of the Act, th e r ep ort 
charg ed, labor unions had dictat e d not only to manag e ment but 
also to the Uovernment, proof of which was the recen t revision 
of the Governme nt's wage-stabilization p ro g ram due to the 
arh itrary demands of labor leaders in the coal and steel 
strike s of 1946. As for the Norris-LaGuardia Act, its p rohi-
h ition of injunctive reli e f had accomp lished the weakeni n g of 
the courts and thereb y endangere d the puhlic intere st, jeo-
p ardized the p rivate p roperty of emp loyers, and denied p rotec-
tion to work ers who p referred not to join unions. 'I'he main 
arg ument of the NAM r eport a gainst the Wa g es and Hours Act 
d ealt with overtime p ay, which was alleged to have the effect 
of raising p rices, to the detriment of business and the p uh lic. 
Sp ecific gri evances raised in the NAM r eport centered 
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first on the closed shop, said to involve frequent coercion 
through intimidation and the use of force by unions against 
emp loyees preferring not to join; no reference was made, of 
course, to the sometime use of similar methods by emp loyer 
groups maintaining the open shop, or the fact that where unions 
have closed shop and union shop agreements with employers the 
necessity of resorting to such methods by unions is minimized. 
Another NAM grievance was industry-wide bargaining, which was 
denounced as "monopolistic," unfair, and injurious to husiness. 
The jurisdictional strike was also condemned, as involving no 
issue with the employer but simply a contest of power between 
rival unions. Another complaint, the payment of portal-to-
portal pay, bore directly on the United Mine Workers who had 
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in 1945 won the concession of payment for the considerable ttme 
spent by miners travelling underground to and from their work, 
a concession which the NAM denounced as forcing emp loyers to 
pay huge sums for time not spent in working, hence not 
warranting payment. 
Turning from grievances to their correction, the NAM 
r eport declared that the NLRA and other New Deal l eg islation 
had been inadequate to curb labor conflicts and had indeed 
been at the root of labor strife. An overhauling of all these 
laws was needed. The result of the November elections was 
declared to constitute a mandate to effect reform on the part 
of a people angered hy the nation's economic maladjustments, 
which rose out of labor controversies. That John L. Lewis and 
the UMW played no small part in the background of this report 
was indicated by the reference to the coal strike earlier in 
1946 and to the portal-to-portal provision, and by the demand 
for revision of the anti-injunction Norris-LaGuardia Act which 
the courts had recently been forced to circumlocute in order 
to emp loy the injunction against the mine rs; was indicated as 
well hy the fulminations against "ruthless and unscrupulous" 
labor leaders and "labor monopolies." Indirect influenc e was 
indicated also hy the fact that the national elections had come 
at the height of a critical controversy involving Lewis and the 
~V, a fact which appeared to give point to the claim that the 
Republican victory represented a mandate to revise the labor 
laws. 
While the momentum of public opinion and the efforts of 
organized agents of employer groups drove in the direction 
of restrictive labor legislation, organized labor viewed the 
trend with alarm. The adverse action of the courts in the D1ffl 
case in 1946 aroused general dismay in the ranks of organized 
lahor at what was described by William Green, president of 
the American Federation of La't-or, as "this r e version to the 
archaic philosophy of government hy injunction and this p er-
10 
version of the Norris-LaGuardia Act." Labor leaders were 
clearly aware that the action in the Lewis case was, moreover, 
merely part of a broad trend and the prelude to ominous change 
in national labor policy. This view was expressed aft e r 
Goldshorough's decision against Lewis and the UMW, by Philip 
-86-
Murray, president of the CIO, who regarded the decision as 
part of a "deliberate and monstrous movement under way to 
cripple, if not destroy, the labor movement; 11 he went on to 
say that since the close of the war the industrial interests, 
tog ether with their representatives in Congress, had directed 
an unabated attack on labor, had taken deliberate measures to 
hring ahout inflation and through 11 vicious propaganda 11 laid 
the hlame on American workers, and had finally seized on the 
pretext to claim a false popular mandate in the November 
elections, of which Murray said: 
The election results of November 5 have 
been deliberately misinterpreted by 
these very same predatory interests as 
a stamp of app roval upon their evil 
design, and has obviously encouraged 
them to deepen their attack upon organ-
ized labor. 11 
Transition in Washington 
By December, 1946, when the trial of John L. Lewis and 
the United Mine Workers in the Federal District Court of the 
District of Columbia brought the issue of labor p olicy to a 
dramatic focus, the political climate of opinion was threaten-
ing . Ineffective pleas for moderation were made by Congress-
ional leaders such as Senator Alben W. Barkley who counseled 
Congress not to "pass punitive 1 egisla tion because it is mad 
12 
at some one man. 11 The same a ppeal was made by President 
Truman in his State of the Union address in January, 1947. 
While conceding the need for improvement of the existing laws, 
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the President asked that changes not r e instituted mer el y a s 
a n expression of antag onism to lab or leaders currently involved 
in controversy. He said: 
We must not, however, adopt punitive 
legislation. We must not, in order 
to punish a few lab or leaders, pass 
vindictive laws which will restrict 
the p roper ri ghts of the rank and 
file of labor •••• During t h e last 
decade and a half, we have estab lished 
a national labor policy in this 
country h as ed upon free colle ctive 
bargaining as the p rocess for deter-
mining wages and working conditions. 
This is still the national and 
it should continue to b e the national 
policy.. • • 13 
Congr e ss was not inclined, however, to h eed counsels 
of moderation or to confine itself to slight measur e s. Many 
Democr ats joined with Re publicans in calling for sweep ing 
reforms. Senator Scott Lucas of Illinois, for examp le, 
declar ed: 
Certainly the spectacle of John~. Lewis' 
a bility to shut down the merican economy 
at will calls for an intensive examination 
of how it is possible for one man to 
achi e ve a position of such power. Arro-
gance which threatens the p ub lic int erest 
must be challenged.... 14 
On Decemb er 20 1 Rep resentative Harold v. Smith of Virginia, 
who had earlier contributed to lab or leg islation as co-author 
of the War ~ahor Disputes Act, complet ed the draft of a b ill 
desig n e d to revise drastically the (Wagne r) National Lahor 
15 
Re lations Act. The p urpose of t h is hill, according to 
Smith, was to "restore equality betwee n unions and industry11 
by regulating or p rohihiting "practices that have led to th e 
present lab or dictatorship ." The attack on t he Wa gner Act, 
claimed to b e the root of the labor p rohlem, had hegun. 
Senator James Murray, Chairman of t he Labor Committe e , was 
one of the dwindling number of defenders of the Wagner Act; 
Murray denied the widely accep ted argument that lab or had an 
overbalance of power, and asserted that not only wa s management 
quite capahle of defending itself but it was never stronger 
16 
than at that time. Defenders of the Wagner Act hecame 
increasingly ineffectual as the Republicans and conservative 
Democrats gained ascendancy. 
-89-
· The legislative movement paralleled the NAM p rogram, which 
beg an as an attack on the Wagner Act, then shifted to an 
attack on organized lahor. The NAM, which denied the existence 
of any federal lahor policy, called for one "outlawing once and 
for all monopoly in unions - industrywide hargaining, closed 
17 
shop, secondary b oycott" and other p ractices. The cry of 
"labor monop oly" was echoed in Congre ss. On January 10, 
Rep uh lican Senator Joseph Ball of Minnesota p roposed a p ro-
hihition on industrywide bargaining by cutting off the 
authority of international unions over their local unions, and 
18 
allowing injunctive p rocess as remedy for violation. I n the 
example given by Ball, the uMW could not then set a general 
wage for the coal industry, for locals could disregard the 
decisions of the international union; in case of attempted 
coercion of the local h y the central h ody, an injunction 
could be sought and issued against the international union. 
Senator Ball declared, "Certainly John L. Lewis would not be 
19 
an absolute dictator under this bill." The attitude of 
those who held that a mandate for such measures had heen given 
in the elections of 1946, was typified by Senator Robert Taft 
of Ohio, who alleged that "restoration of freedom both to 
indivi duals and to business" and curhing "autocratic labor 
20 
leaders" had been the main issue of the election. 
The decision announced hy the Supreme Court on March 6, 
1947, regarding Lewis and the UMW, not only served a telling 
blow against Lewis and by implication other "autocratic 
la"='or leaders," but also afforded a favorable climate for 
restrictive labor legislation. Political reaction to the 
decision was enthusiastic. For example, Congressman Graham 
Borden of North Carolina exclaimed, "Thank God, our democracy 
21 
is still supreme." Senator John McClellan of Arkansas 
exp ressed gratification that "the court has sustained the 
sovereignty of the Government against the assault made upon it 
22 
by John L. Lewis and his union." The court's revival of the 
labor injunction was of special significance to Congressional 
policy-makers. The d e cision was not, however, of sufficiently 
broad scope in the view of legislative leaders, to meet the 
requirements of the labor situation. As Senator Ball, a 
memher of the Senate Labor and Welfare Committee, stated, 
"We still have got to do something about industry-wide bar-
gaining, and I think we also should do something about the 
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23 
closed shop." Representative Hartley, a. member of the House 
Labor Committee, rep orted that after a hearing was comp let e d 
a bill would shortly be reported out by the Gommittee, and 
that while the Court decision was help ful the re must he 
"added pressure" hehind the drive to outlaw industry-wide 
24 
bargaining in order to end the ~ndustry-wide strike s. In 
any case, as Senator Taft averred, 11 The decision will tend 
to clarify the legal situation and assist us in drafting labor 
25 
legi slation." 
Protest by the UMW Against Congressional Policy 
On March 7, a defeated John L. Lewis testifi e d before 
the Senate Labor and Public Welfare Committee reg arding labor 
26 
measures proposed in Congress. Harshly beaten hy the courts, 
bitter toward the revival of the injunction, the dour warrior 
pleaded labor 1 s case against new restrictive laws. The day 
of governmental paternalism was gone. With the fall elections 
of 1946 and the entrance of a Republican majority in Cong ress, 
New Deal henevolence had passed. Lewis faced a committee 
dominat e d by Republican Senators Taft of Ohio, Aiken of 
Vermont, Ball of Minnesota, Morse of Oregon, Donnell of 
Missouri, Jenner of Indiana, and Ives of New York; with Demo-
cratic Senators Thomas of Utah, Murray of Montana, Pepper of 
Florida, Ellender of Louisiana, and Hill of Alabama. 
Lewis' arguments, as summarized in the United Mine 
Workers Journal against the imminent revision of national 
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labor policy, covered broad grounds. Following the first 
World War, lahor had felt that a struggle to p reserve democracy 
should include democracy for the labor movement. John L. Lewis 
used this same argument with reference to World War II. The 
United States had entered that war with a body of laws 
guaranteeing and implementing the right of labor to organize 
and to bargain collectively; after the victorious close of 
that war, it was proposed to rep ay labor for its services by 
limiting and denying liberties and rights necessary to the 
welfare of organized workers. 
Specifically, Lewis attacked, among other proposals, one 
for a "cooling-off period" of sixty days hefore the declaration 
of a strike. fhe right to strike being a fundamental right of 
labor, any such attempt to delimit that right was, according 
to Lewis, equivalent to a "placing of labor in irons, 11 since 
it would destroy the very premise for collective bargaining 
during that period and deprive organized workers of their 
chief means of influence over wages, hours, and working condi-
tions. This provision, as Lewis was clearly aware, would 
hear with s pecial weight on the miners, whose bargaining power 
dep ended largely on timing, hence a sixty-day postponement 
during the most favorahle season might pro ve fatal to their 
neg otiations. 
In the 1946 controversy it was assumed that Lewis and 
the UMW had committed a breach of the Krug-Lewis Agreement, a 
contract hetween the Government and the miners. It was now 
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proposed in Congress to make labor unions suable for any 
breach of contract, a p roposal which Lewis appeared to r egard 
as a p ointed attack upon his union. ~he United Mine Workers, 
he declared, had an unsurpassed record of carrying out their 
contracts, and in case of an alleged breach of contract there 
were provisions contained in the agreement for determining 
whether a hreach had occurred and affording a remedy. The 
assump tion of union responsibility for a lab or contract, he 
stated, was b ased on the erroneous helief that corp orations 
were similarly resp onsible, whereas lahor contracts were not, 
in practice, enforceable against corporations. 
Proposals to bar sup ervisory employees from lahor union 
memb ersh i p were said by Lewis to be e qually ill-founded. A 
restriction on the organization of this group, for whose 
inclusion Lewis had struck in the fall of 1945, woul d mean 
dep riving such employees of their equal right to org anize and 
b argain collectively. Moreover, the arg ument offere d by coal 
op erators, that uni onization of supervisory emp loye e s would, 
b y affecting discip line, endanger the lives and limb s of 
workers in the mines, was negated by the appalling record of 
casualties in the coal industry without unionization of 
supervisors. 
The most alarming of the measures p roposed in Cong res s , 
one to p rohihit industry-wide bargaining, was regarded by 
Lewis as aimed at destroying the American labor movement. 
This p roposal, which the UMW chief attributed to the NAM, 
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the United States Chamber of Commerce, and the National Coal 
Association, he described as "one of the most flagrant p ro-
p osals against the right of workers to exercise their b asic 
rights that has b een proposed in Congre ss." Lewis pointed 
out that the recommendation emanated from sources which them-
selves enjoyed the benefits of national organization and 
collective action, while se eking to deny similar benefits to 
employees. The aim of such a p rohibition, he stated, was to 
11 isolate the labor unions into small g roups and by p incer 
movements destroy them." 
The reality that was cloaked in talk concerning the 
puhlic interest was, in Lewis' view, simply the determination 
to drain the p ower of the unions by outlawing the closed s h op 
and drastically curtailing collective bargaining and strike s. 
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Proposals for conciliation, mediation, and voluntary arbitration 
all tended in the direction of compulsory arbitration. "Simply 
stated," he said, "the whole design is to curb the economic 
power of unions and p rohihit closed shops and strik es," a 
development he termed the first step toward a "corp orate or 
absolute state." The claim that labor unions under the Wa gner 
Act held the advantage over emp loyers in bargaining p ower was 
"hypocritical and without foundation. 11 Moreover, Lewis drew 
on statements and figures printed by a prominent business 
28 
p uhlication to show that, despite labor dis putes and high 
taxes, the year 1946 was the peak year in American business 
history for corporate p rofits; business allegations of injury 
due to labor disturbances were therefore untrue. Big business 1 
swollen with war profits and power, was now driving a great 
offensive to undermine the trade unions, and was supported 
by p roponents of punitive and restrictive legislation who 
claimed to have received a mandate in the recent Congressional 
elections to enact such legislation. The truth, however, 
Lewis d e clared, was that such legislation was not an issue 
in the campaign and indeed the platforms of hoth parties 
promised to protect and implement lahor rights rather than the 
contrary. The leader of the UMW closed his, and labor's 
hrief with a preoration that pointed the overall issue and 
with characteristic shrewdness turned on the revisionists their 
own argument; he stated: 
The National Labor Relations Act, 
the Clayton Act, the Norris-LaGuardia 
Anti-Injunction Act, and the Fair Lahor 
Standards Act constitute the American 
Industrial Code. Big business has never 
accepted this code. The way to indus-
trial peace is through the accep tance 
by big business of collective bar-
g aining in conformance with the pro-
visions of this code. 
The demand now to control and regi-
ment labor by repealing and amending these 
laws and passing shackling legislation, 
if accepted and enacted into law by Congr e ss, 
will eventually lead to bureaucratic 
control and regimentation of business as 
well as labor and will destroy our free 
enterprise system. It will lead straight 
down the road to a socialistic hureaucratic 
state. 29 
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Revision of National Labor Policy 
On April 17, 1947, the Hartley bill was passed in the 
30 
House "with exultant shouts," and on June 23 a conference 
bill was passed over President Truman's veto b y a vote of 
331-83 in the House and 68-25 in the Senate, hecoming law as 
31 
the (Taft-Hartley) Labor-Manag ement Relations Act . This law, 
marking the culmination of the postwar counter-movement in 
national lahor p olicy, revised labor policy by amending the 
National Labor Relations Act of 1935, emasculating the Norris-
LaGuardia Act of 1932 by r emoval of its p rotection against 
injunctions in proceeding s under the new law, a.nd adding n ew 
limitations on trade unions along with new procedures for 
32 
settling disputes. Managerial reaction was indicated by 
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Business Week, which hailed the act as "A New Deal for America's 
Emp loyer str and declared enthusiasticall.y, 11The era of the 
33 
Wa gner Act has ended." Lahor reaction, on the other hand, 
was viol ently opp os ed, and John L. Lewis angrily described 
the act as "the first ugly, savage thrust of fascism in 
34 
Ame rica. 11 
The features of the law may he briefly described. The 
Wagner Act was rewritten in title I of the Labor-Management 
Relations Act by adding the p roscription of certain union 
actions as unfair labor p ractices, by changing definitions and 
phraseology ., and by limiting the discretion of the National 
35 
Labor Relations Board. The hasic NLRA guarantee of ri ghts of 
emp loye e s was amended by adding the ri ght of emp loyees to 
refrain from collective action and by protecting the activities 
of nonunion employees. The most important of the unfair labor 
practices prohihited to labor organizations or their officers 
were secondary boycotts and jurisdictional disputes; the 
former were disallowed and in the case of the latter, over 
work assi gnments, the issue was to he determined by the 
National Labor Relations Board unless the parties adjusted 
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their dispute within ten days. These actions were to be sub -
ject to court injunctions and also to private suits for damages. 
Injunctions could be sought by the President, moreover, when-
ever a strike would in his opinion 11 imperil the national 
health or safety," and after receipt of a report by a board 
of inquiry a ppointed by him. Other unfair labor p ractices 
prohibited included coercion of emp loyees in the exercise of 
their rights, which were made to include the "right 11 to 
refuse to join a union; the refusal to bargain collectively; 
coercion of employers in the choice of their rep resentatives 
in collective bargaining; obliging employers to discharg e 
workers for nonmembership in a union under a union-sh op 
a greement; and compelling employers to pay for services not 
actually performed. The closed shop was prohibited and 
union membership could be required as a condition of emp loy-
ment only after an election under the National Lahor Relations 
Board in which such a clause was voted by a majority of all 
employees in the unit. 
The unfair labor practices prohihited to employers by 
the Wagner Act were on the whole retained, except with regard 
to the closed shop, but the prohi~itions were weakened by a 
numher of provisions such as those requiring equal treatment by 
the NLRB for company-dominated or other independent unions, and 
enlarg ing employer rights with regard to reinstatement and 
hack p ay and by the exclusion of employer p ropaganda from use 
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as evidence of unfair labor p ractice. Some oth er p oints con-
t ended for by employers were conceded. Sup ervisor~ emp loyees 
wer e excluded from union membersh i p and restrictions were 
placed on the organi~ation of guards and professional employe e s. 
Provision was made for elections to rescind authorization for 
union-shop agreements. At the same time handicaps were p laced 
on the unions making it more difficult for them to use the 
machinery of the Act; the chief of these were the requirement 
of exp ensive and time-consuming financial reports to the 
Secretary of Labor by hoth local and international unions, and 
t h e requirement that e ach union officer file an affidavit that 
he was not a Communist or a believer in such doctrine s. The 
unions were made suarle in federal courts for breaches of 
contract. Political contributions by unions were also pro-
hihited. Other p rovisions, of an administrative nature, 
p romised complexity and confusion in interpretation and 
administration of the law. 
The Taft-Hartley Act was and has remained highly 
controversial. As sound a conclusion as any, p erhaps, h y a 
scholarly labor analyst, is as follows: 
Viewed as a whole, the Taft-Hartley Act 
is complex, detailed, and ri g id, and in-
volves an unprecedented intervention by 
g overnment into the processes and terms 
of collective bargaining. It restricts 
some clearly ohjectionable practi c es of 
unions. At some points it expands the 
freedom of employers, at others limits 
their right to work out solutions hy 
free collective hargaining. At some 
points it protects individual employees, 
at many others it weakens t h em hy weak-
ening their unions. By its complexities 
it makes more difficult the p rotection 
of the Qasic rights of self-organization 
and concerted activity still guaranteed 
hy the Act. It puts increased reliance 
up on the courts rather than up on the 
flexihle administrative process for the 
protection of rights in this field. 36 
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Regarding the overall shift in policy, both in national 
and state legislatures, a historian wrote: 
In historical perspective, the counter-
march in lahor legislation ••• may not appe ar 
as devastating as it did while it was under-
way. It moved back New Deal positions, hut 
it did not wipe them out •••• 
In the regulation of union affairs, the 
countermarch overrode the former laissez-
faire attitude of government and commenced 
a new type of governmental control •••• The 
philosophy of union re gulation involved 
in those regulations was almost limitless. 37 
The real significance of the revised national labor 
p olicy was, however, not so much in what was accomp lished 
in leg islative reconstruction as in the ch anged attitude 
emhodied therein. The dominant attitude now was that g uaran-
tees to laror had gone far enough and even too far, that lahor 
h eld an overbalance of p ower in relation to management, and 
that lahor organizations had come into the bands of ruthless 
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and autocratic leaders whose policies were contrary to the 
puhlic interest; the conclusion heing that it was ·time to 
reduce the power of organized labor by leg islation and to 
regulate union activities. In bringing this adverse attitude 
to the fore, John L. Lewis and the u:rviW had provided a major 
stimulus and symhol. It was rep orted in 1948, when Lewis 
was defying the Taft-Hartley Act, that even labor leaders 
helieved that "the UMW president himself is largely resp onsihle 
38 
for the Taft-Hartley Act which he is seeking to circumvent." 
Desp ite the change in the atmosphere of g overnment, of which 
he was so much the cause, John L. Lewis would not cease heing 
his own peculiar institution, and he would not c ease to fig ht. 
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Chapter VI 
After the Taft-Hartly Act 
While the pas s age of the Taft-Hartley Act was greet ed 
with a roar of indignation from organized lahor, within a 
short time all the major unions had complied with the Act -
all ~ut John L. Lewis and the ~v. The enactment of the law 
on June 23 over the Presidential veto was greeted with wildcat 
strikes in mines in Alabama and Pennsylvania, which rapidly 
1 
spr ead across the nation, but these were quickly ended. 
Lewis' hop e was that organized labor would bring about a 
collap se of the law by a general boycott. He won over the AFL 
executive council to agree to boycott the Taft-Hartley Act by 
refusing to comply with the requirements of financial reports 
and non-Communist affidavits; the AFL convention in the fall of 
1947 voted, however, to comply with the Act, upon which Lewis, 
temporarily back in the AFL fold, angrily withdrew the UMW 
deleg ation and sent President William Green the brusque note: 
2 
11We disaffiliate. 11 Lewis remained alone in noncomp liance. 
Meanwhile Lewis continued in strength on the economic 
front. On June 30, 1947, with the expiration of the Krug-Lewis 
3 
contract, private operation of the coal mines was resumed. 
lnstead of the exp ected strike, an agreement between the ~V 
4 
and the coal operators was announced. The contract, the best 
in the union's history, gave the miners a wage increase to 
$13.05 for eight hours instead of the former level of $ 11.85 
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for nine hours, thoug h overtime was to begin after eight hours 
of work rather than after seven hours. An increase was made 
in royalty payments to the welfare fund, from five cents a ton 
to ten cents. The very important provision was included, for 
the designation of a pension fund out of the welfare fund. 
The clause pledging no strikes for the duration of the contract 
was omitted, and disputes regarding interpretation of the 
contract were to be settled by a labor-management conference 
rather than by the National Labor Relations Roard. Most 
significantly, the contract was made to cover only miners 
"arle and willing to work," thus seeking to place the settle-
ment outside the terms of the Taft-Hartley Act since work 
stoppage by miners unable and unwilling to work could not 
legally be called a strike in violation of contract; thus the 
employer lawsuit provisions of the law were circumvented. 
Lewis used the occasion for an attack on the Taft-
Hartley Act. He was particularly incensed at the provision of 
that Act requiring that union welfare funds to which employers 
contrihuted could not be administered solely hy the union. 
He charged that negotiations relating to the welfare fund had 
h e en impeded hy the "Taft slave act which of course was 
5 
intended to scuttle the fund.n Lewis also hinted at political 
retaliation in the 1948 elections, declaring: 
I hold responsible every member of the 
House and Senate who voted for the 
detestable act. Of course it is obvious 
that the Republican party sold out to 
American industry for cash contributions 
to the Congressional campaign. There is 
one thing about the Republican Congress, 
they stay bought. 6 
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Peace reigned in the soft coal fields during the 
remainder of 1947. Lewis' position was strong. His union had 
assumed the role of p ace-setter in wages in American industry. 
He had won a contra ct which included a large increase in the 
welfare fund and the p rinciple, at least, of a pension for the 
miners. While he denounced the new law as vindictive and 
oppressive and though he refused to comply with the rep ort and 
affidavit p rovisions, he made no overt attempt to defy the law. 
He had won the advantageous 1947 contract without a strike 
and without serious resistance from the operat ors, p rohahly 
hecause coal was in great demand and prices were hig h, and 
partly hecause a Lewis uictory in a head-on conflict might 
create an unfavorahle atmosphere f or g eneral accep tance of the 
Taft - Hartley Act. That the operators did not suffe r any loss 
in granting a wage increase was indicated by the speedy action 
of Pittshurg h Consolidation Coal Company in raising coal p rices 
75 c ents a ton, althoug h the per-ton cost of the additional 
hene fits unde r the contract was estimat ed at not more than 
7 
38 .5 cents a ton. 
The peace established in coal was, however, a short one . 
A disp ute arose over the p ension question, which was und er 
conside ration hy a committee of three memhers as p rovided u nder 
the 1947 contract. In January, 1948, Mr. Murray, the neutral 
memher, r e signed on the ground that he had fail e d to secure 
agr eement on a p ension p roposal from John L. Lewis, repre-
senting the miners, or Ezra Van Horn, representing the operators, 
so with no headway made by Fehruary 2 in securing an accept-
ahle successor, John L. Lewis addressed a letter to the 
8 
signatories of the contract. Lewis advised the ope rators 
t hat, in consequence of non-fulfillment of the contract, the 
United Mine Workers "reserves the ri ght, at will, to take any 
9 
independent action necessary." On March 12, Lewis notified 
the union memhers that the operators had failed to a g re e to a 
10 
p ension p lan and had therefore "dishonored" their contract. 
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Ry the following day, in accordance with t heir 11 no contract, 
no work" policy, over 200,000 hituminous miners left the p its. 
The machinery of the Taft-Hartley Act was hrought into 
p lay hy President Truman. On March 24, the President appoint e d 
a thre e-man hoard to investigate the dispute and determine 
whether the strike imperilled the national health and safety; 
the hoard consisted of Judg e Sherman Minton of the Seventh 
u.s. Circuit Court of Appeals, Dr. Georg e w. Taylor of the 
Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania, and Mark Ethridge , 
11 
puhlisher of the Louisville Courier. 
Lewis refused to t e stify at the opening 8ession of the 
hoard on the g round that he had not studied the legal questi ons 
12 
involved in the hoard's invitation to testify. The wariness 
disp layed hy Lewis arose out of the fact that the Taft-Hartley 
Act p rovided for issue of an injunction forty-ei ght hours 
after receipt hy the Pre s ident of a report finding the nationa l 
health Rnd safety to b e endang ered hy the strike . After a few 
days Lewis wrote a letter to the b oard g iving the following 
reasons for his unwilling ness to attend: 
1. The law 
No action has hee n taken by this 
writer or the United Mine Workers of 
America as such, which would fall within 
the purview of the op pres s ive statute 
under which you seek to function •••• 
2. Prejudice 
'l'wo rnemhers of your hoard are hiased 
and prejudiced and in honor should not 
serve. They are Ethridge and Taylor. 
Since the incep tion of this imhrog lio, 
Ethridge p uh lished hiased and p rejudici a l 
editorials and special articles dele-
t erious to this union and this writer in 
a newspap er controlled hy him. 
Taylor for years has been an adminis-
trative hanger-on in Washington, and he 
has never lost an opp ortunity to harass 
and p ersecute this union and this writer. 
He is inherently incapable of determining 
the distinction between a fact and a 
scruple •. 
In attendance is Ching, a truly 
remarkable man who s ee s through the eyes 
of United States Ruhher. 13 
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Lewis nevertheless appeared before the hoard on March 30 , 
14 
though only "under compulsion." He adopted the p osition 
that the Taft-Hartley law was not ap plicarle to the situation, 
since no strike within the meaning of that Act had been 
called. Lewis denied that the February 2 letter to the op e ra-
t ors, con taining the statement that the UMW "reserves the 
right, at will, to take any indep endent action ne ces s ary," was 
15 
a strike notice. When queried hy .Judge Minton as to whe the r 
t he "independent action" was not the result of Lewis' letter 
to the min ers on March 12, Lewis disclaimed any connection and 
a s serted the letter was merely "a long delayed and much over-
due rep ort to the heneficiaries of the contract in exp lanation 
of why they were not getting the pensions p romised." Minton 
insisted, however, that there was a direct relation h e twe en 
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the letter and the strike to which Lewis r eplied, "If the pur-
p ose of your question is Dased on the premise that I consp ire d 
hy my letter to have the miners stop work, then you are 
entirely in error." Throughout the questioning Lewis stuhhornly 
maintained that the miners had acted entirely on their own, 
"as individuals," as a result of the op erators' failure to 
honor the contract, and not at all in response to any orders 
or dir ections from John L. Lewis or the international union. 
He reit erated this position in a general circular to the miners 
a few days later, in which he stated: 
Your actions in this regard in the 
original instance were your own, indivi-
dually determine d by you •••• 
I, therefore, now repeat that you 
are not now under and ·have never heen 
under any orders, directions, or sugges-
tions expressed or implied from me or 
any of the union officers to cease work 
or to continue to cease work in protest 
to the present dishonoring (as we se e it) 
of th e 1947 contract. 16 
The Government, however, regarded the issue as a strike . 
The hoard of inquiry submitted a r eport finding the nation 
t hre atened with a serious situation, so on April 3 President 
Truman ordered Attorney General Clark to take action a g ainst 
"a strike ••• which ••• will imperil the national health and 
safety" hy petitioning, pursuant to Section 208 of the Labor-
Management Relations Act of 1947, to enjoin the continuance of 
17 
such strike. A temporary injunction, effective until April 
18 
13, was issued on the following day. 
The U~V officials ignored the court order. By a 
surprise move, however, the dispute between the union and the 
op erators was shortly brought to settlement. On April 10 
Joe Martin, Republican Speaker of the House, intervened and 
p ersuaded Lewis to accept Senator Styles Bridges of New 
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19 
Hampshire as the neutral third member of the p ension committ ee . 
After a day of discussion, and over the ohjections of the 
operators' representative, Senator Bridges' proposal of a 
p e nsion of '100 a month was adopted, applying to miners over 
sixty-two years of age with twenty years of service in t he 
20 
mines, p rovided they had retired after May 28, 1946. Lewis 
himself had originally demanded a pension for all miners on 
21 
reaching the age of sixty after twenty years of service. 
The acceptance by Lewis of the Repub lican Speaker's interven-
tion was regarded hy many as p olitically motivated, an attemp t 
to embarra ss the Truman administration by crediting a Republican 
lead er with settlement of the disp ut e . Senator J. Howard 
McGrath, Chairman of the Democratic National Committee, declared : 
In his customary dramatic manner he (Lewis) 
has heen able to ge t the cooperation of 
the legislative branch of the Government, 
thereby setting a dangerous p recedent that 
makes more -difficult the execution of the 
laws of Congress by the executive branch •••• 
Mr. Lewis, driven to cover hy a Democratic 
administration, fled for aid and comfort to 
his own party. His union memhers suffered 
considerably so that Mr. Lewis might en joy 
his Repuhlican honeymoon. 22 
-110-
With the settlement of the pension issue, Lewis wired a 
laconic message to the miners: "Pensions guarante ed. The 
23 
a g reement is now honored." The telegram initiated the 
return of miners to work, but did not erase the contempt of 
court charges pend ing before Judge Goldsborough for the con-
tinuance of the strike after issue of a restraining order. 
Attorneys for the United Mine Workers contended that Lewis 
had not called a strike but had merely notified the miners 
as to the status of the pension question, and that the e ntire 
is sue had heen settled p rior to the hearing on the contempt 
c h arges; Judge Goldsborough refused, however, to accep t this 
r easoning and handed down a decision on April 19 finding Lewis 
24 
and the ~v guilty of civil and criminal contemp t. 
Lewis' denial that he had called the strike was dis-
missed hy Goldsborough with the assertion that no other 
feasihle interpretation could be made under the circumstan c e s 
and that "a nod, a wink, or a code 11 would he as valid a strike 
25 
call as if an explicit strike notice had heen given. 
Goldshorough construed the messages of .t<'ehruary 2 and April 1 2 
to the miners as the direct causes of the cessation and resump-
tion of work, hence in effect a code. In rejecting the argu-
men ts for the de fense, ~oldsborough enunciated a new p rinciple 
of law, declaring union responsihility for the collective 
action of its memhers. He stated: 
Now the court thinks the principle 
is this: That as long as a union is 
functioning as a union it must he held 
responsible for the mass action of its 
members. It is perfectly o~vious ••• 
that men don't act collectively without 
leadership •••• 
You can't preserve a union any other 
way •••• 
So that the rule of law which I have 
announced is the only rule which will 
prese rve the unions, hecause if the p lan 
is adopted throughout the country of 
trying to use a wink, a nod, a code, 
instead of the word 1 strike 1 , and if that 
sort of maneuver is r e cognized as valid 
by the courts then you will have among 
the unions lawlessness, chaos, and ulti-
mate anarchy. And then the unions will 
have to be socialized. In other words 
they will have to be destroyed. 26 
As in 1946 defiance of the injunction brought heavy 
penalties. Judge Goldsborough levied fines for criminal con-
tempt of :jp 20,000 against Sohn L. Lewis and 1 1 400,000 against 
the United Mine Workers, which were douhle the 1946 levies as 
reduced hy the Supreme Court. At the suggestion of Assistant 
ttorney Gen eral Morrison, however, the punishment for civil 
con temp t was p ostponed indefinitely, since 85 per c ent of the 
27 
miner s had returned to work after the second Lewis messag e . 
This encounter with Judge Goldsrorough was not to '~--e the 
last, for Lewis' embroilments with the courts, the Government, 
and the Taft-Hartley Act, recurred in later months. The day 
after the Goldshrough decision, thousands of miners walked 
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off in p rotest, hut at the prompt issue of a preliminary 
injunction hy Goldsborough Lewis quickly ordered the miners b ack 
28 
to work. Suhsequent incidents had a more favorable outcome 
• 
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for the UMW. On June 22, John L. Lewis was as startled as the 
coal operators, who had brought suit for an injunction to 
h lock payments for the miners• pension p lan adopted April 12, 
to h ear Goldshorough deny their pe tition for injunction and 
declare that the pension p lan was necessary to the miners• 
29 
welfare. The p ossib ility of a major dis pute occurring with 
the exp iration of the miners' contract on July 1 was averted 
heforehand by the conclusion of a contract between Lewis and 
the operators which scored a UMW victory: The contract pre-
served the union-shop clause, p rovided for a pay raise of 
one dollar a day, and increased the royalty payments into the 
welfare fund from ten cents to twenty cents a ton, or a total 
30 
of roughly $100,000,000 a year. The steel industries refused, 
however, to accep t these terms for their captive mines, charging 
that the demand for a union-shop was illegal under the Taft-
Hartley Act. The NLRB petitioned Judge Goldshorough for an 
injunction to restrain Lewis from demanding a union-shop, but 
instead, on J uly 13, after Goldsborough mediated the strike and, 
after r eaching a settlement, dismissed the petition for an 
31 
injunction. Lewis for the first time had accepted the Taft-
Hartley Act p rocedure for adjudication of a dispute, though he 
continued to oppose the Act and refused to qualify for access 
to the Act by signing a non-Communist affidavit • 
One further incident, also peacefully resolved, marked 
the year. A charge had heen filed with the NLRB on April 8 by 
the Southern Coal ~reducers Association, that Lewis had refused 
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to permit Joseph Moody, president of the Association, to take 
part in a negotiating confere nce with the UMW. At the request 
of the NLRB, Goldsborough ordered the UMW to bargain with the 
Southern p roducers, up on which Lewis, fearing an injunction, 
32 
ag reed to hold talks. The union's refusal would have fall en 
under the Taft-Hartley prohibition a gainst union attemp ts to 
coerce employers -in the choice of their own representatives in 
collective bargaining , rut after p rotra cted delays the dispute 
was settl ed and at the request of the NLRB the case was with-
33 
dra•vn in Octoher. 
As t he year 1948 drew to a close, Lewis and t he U1~1V'/ 
remained relatively quiescent. His p osition in the American 
laror sc ene was one of leadership. Despit e sethacks at t he 
hands of Gov e rnment and th e courts, partly t h rough the Taft-
Hart l ey Act, his union had achieve d great social g ains throug h 
i mp roved safety measures, the welfare fund, and the p ension; 
the UMW had also hecome the pace-setter for wag e s in Americ an 
industry, the last raise, in July, 1948 , for example, having 
initi at e d t he third round of wage increase s in the ra sic indus-
tries. 
Lewis had defi e d or soug ht to evade the r evise d national 
lahar policy, mor e than incidentally aime d at hims elf and t he 
UMW , at c onsiderable cost. Ye t when org anized lahar took 
active p art in the fall e l e ctions in 1 948, Lewis confi n e d 
himself to stentorian hlasts at Truman and the Taft-Hartley 
34 
Act. The p os i tion of President Truman, who campaigned a g ainst 
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the Taft-Hartley Act, was to some extent embarrassed by his 
tr eatment of John L. Lewis, for Repuhlicans were able to p oint 
out that it was Truman who r e commended, in the sp ring strike 
of 1946, Government seizure end even the drafting of striker s, 
that it was Truman's use of t he injunction against John L. 
Lewi s that paved the way for that provision of the n ew law, 
35 
a nd that it was Truman who brought the Act into op eration. 
Yet Truman did not suffer a heavy political p enalty, in p art 
hecause so much of the nation shared the attitude exp ressed 
hy Goldshorough onee when, exaspe rated at Lewis' actions, h e 
quoted Cic ero 1 s denunciation of Catiline: "It is your t-o1.mdle s s 
36 
audacity, 0 Catiline." 
The countermarch in labor leg islation bad not broken 
o r even materially che cked John L. Lewis or the advance of 
organized la1""~or. The Taft-Hartley Act followed in detail the 
recommendations of the NAM, except for one point, the out-
lawi n g of industry-wide hargaining , hut r e consi derat ion at a 
lat e r date wa s promised by Congressional leaders . Failure to 
p rovide l eg islation on this crucial p oint, the outl awing of 
industry-wide rar g aining , left extreme p oponents of r e stric-
tive legislation keenly dissatisfied. Rep resentative Hartley, 
for example, Republican co-author of the Lab or-Manag ement 
Relations Act of 1947, declared that Repuhli can l eaders had 
failed to 11 finish the job" and that after th e p assage of the 
Taft-Hartley law they had decided to p o stpone further leg is-
lation ohjectionahle to laror until after the 1948 el ections; 
he declared, in disgruntled overstatement: 
Fran_1{l y, I think the United Mine · ~orke rs 
(John L. Lewis' union) could have thrown 
a p icket line around the United States 
Cap itol and the Supreme Court without 
receiving more than a g entle reprimand 
from the Republican l eaders . 37 
In the years that followed, Lewis maintained his record as 
"strike king," though l eading no strikes of long duration 
since 1 948 , and it was conjectured hop efully in the husiness 
p ress that the n ext Cong ress would stop John L. Lewis and 
take action a gainst the "monopolistic" practices of industry-
wide harg aining and industry-wide strikes by revoking the 
38 
unions' exemp tion from the anti-trust laws. Lewis and 
the UMW mi ght yet a gain become the p ivot f or revision of 
n ational labor ~ olicy. 
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Conclusion 
By persistent and vigorous assertion of the practices 
of business unionism, John Llewellyn Lewis drove t he United 
Mine Worker s of .America into a commanding position in the coal 
fields. Long a wage-and-hour organization pursuing the 
Gompers tradition of demanding a g reater and gre ater share of 
the national product and hetter working conditions, the UMW 
'became under Lewis' leadership the pattern-setter in the cycles 
of wage increases after World War II. At the same time the 
union advanced into the field of social welfare, winning a 
massive welfare fund and, of far-reaching importance, the 
pens ion, thus p roviding the miner s with a relative security 
'beyond that possessed hy any other major lahor organization. 
The hasic role of the coal ind ustry in the American 
industrial s tructure made the policies of Lewis and the UMW 
a matter of crucial importanc e for the e conomy, hence a 
suhject of int ense puhlic and political int e r e st. The shape 
and character of the mine l eader 1 s p rogram and actions may 
fairly he said to have heen determined hy his quest for p ower, 
which at one stag e took the di r ection of a desire for high 
political office during the New Deal period; his p olitical 
attitude since 1940 has app eared to be g ov erned hy the 
n egative aim of harassment and retaliation for t he thwarting 
of his own aml--itions. In season and out, however, Lewis 
has generally p ursued the advantage of the miners• union as a 
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corollary to his own. It cannot he said that John L. Lewis has 
not thoroughly represented his constituents though with lit t l e 
or no allowance for democraric self-det erm i nation withi n his 
own union. His g rim p ersistence and contrariety, almost 
heedl e ss of the sharp hostility of emp loyers, Government, and 
the puhlic, made him a byword and a sym~ol of ruthles s and 
antisocial labor leadership. 
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The indep endent course pursued hy the mine rs particularly 
in the war and p ostwar periods, incensed a war-weary puhlic, 
exasperated h y what seemed comp lete disreg ard of national 
s ecurity and the g eneral welfare and incit e d ~y anti-lahor 
purlicists. Uroups and individuals hostile to or g anized la~or 
were afforded a potent p ropaganda sym~ol and argument a g ainst 
"laror dictatorship," which they used as a lever to propel 
punitive and rest r ictive la~or legislation throug h the national 
legislature. Consequently, it may he said that Lewis a nd the 
UMW, a p owerful force in the making of pro-lahor le gislation 
in the New Deal period, also constituted a major ne g ative force 
in the shap ing of the negative p olicy developed after Vorld 
ar II. 
The trend toward legislative r evision was, however, hut 
a p art of a general g overnmental shift particip ated in by the 
executive and judicial hranches of government as well . The 
Truman administration, hy calling for drastic me asur e s aime d 
larg ely at Lewis in 1946, unquestionahly helped to set the 
tone of leg islative policy. The Government's r e sort to the 
injunction, upheld hy the courts, also paved the way for the 
inclusion of that p owerful weap on in the Taft-Hartley Act of 
1 947. In that and the following year, it was the executive, 
moreover, that t e sted and confirmed the new law ~y bringing 
it into operation against John L. Lewis and his union for their 
lone defiance of the Act. The UMW and its chief were harshly 
de alt with hy the judicial as well as the executive arm of 
government. In Goldshorough's court in the District of 
Columhia, apparently swayed hy consl de rations of natlonal 
exigency rather t h an hy le g alisms and employing what s eemed 
loose constructions of law, unp recedented penalties we re 
i mposed for the use of the miners' chief weap on, the ind ustry-
wide strike . The United States Supreme Court, in one of the 
most important lahor cases ever to e~p ear ~efore that trihunal, 
sustained the decision of the lower court by tortuous and 
durious p rocedures and explications of law, and thus confir med 
t h e revival of the lahor injunction, the old n emes is of 
organized lahor. 
Aft er the passag e of the Taft-Hartley Act, the culmina-
tion of the postwar reaction a gainst New Deal lahor policy, 
Lewi s' ohstinacy in evading or i gnoring the law hrought further 
clashes with Government and the courts. Despite temporary 
sethacks, Lewis and the U~ffl cont i nued to ad~ance on the 
e conomic front, and in 1948 the courts and the executive 
hranch, perhap s influenc ed hy the fact that it was an election 
year, exhihited greater restraint in dealing with disputes 
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and legal issues involving the miners . In any event , as Lewis 
continued to make pot ent use of the strike, the proponents of 
extreme restrictive labor leg islation, though pleased with 
the 'I'aft-Hartley Act, continued to press for th e comp l etion 
of their p rog ram including the outlawing o f industry-wide 
harg aining . John L. Lewis was yet at large; autocracy still 
loomed in the land. 
Lewis was, hy 1948 1 passe as a politica l asp irant, and 
p erhap s one of the last of the dinosaurs of the merican lahor 
movement . Nevertheless he remained active an d strong and 
continued to g ive occasion for hope that another l egislative 
u p surge mig ht find a more effective way to check the dour 
warrior of the coal fields. Sohn L. Lewis and the UMW , long 
a force in the councils of the nation, re mained a forc e to 
he conjured with in th e shaping of national lahor p olicy. 
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